Dawnbreak – An Appeal

Posted on 26/02/2025 by muntjac

Dawnbreak, a project which features friends of ours, needs folks to send in audio recordings, minimum 800 word readings or 5 min conversation and storytelling. They only have 10 min of material for episode 1 at this moment. Any ideas, suggestions, submissions to the podcast would be excellent. Truly any, as long as it’s anarchist and anticolonial or antihumanist.

Forge Worlds. Rewrite Rea/ities. Be the Architect of Your Own Destiny.

Narrative is Your Weapon

Are You A artist or creator? iconoclast? Visionary? Dawnbreak media

collective is building an anarchist media project fueled by the power

of storytelling. We’re seeking talented individuals to join us in the

exhilarating work of remaking the world, one narrative ata time.

Dawnbreak timeforge: We believe narratives are temporal

modulators. Forget linear timelines. We explore stories that

rupture the continuum, generating alternative realities.

Craft Worlds: We’re not here to reflect reality, but to reshape it.

We want to make art that fuels insurrection.

Ignite the Spark: Together, we area collection of artists dedicated

to shattering the chains of conformity and craftinga new reality

born of pure imagination.

Wha1 We’re Looking For:

Storytellers: Writers, scriptwriters, podcasters. Tell us your stories.

Worldbuilders: Visual artists, designers, concept artists. Bring your visions to life.

Content Creators: Video editors, audio producers, multimedia specialists. Shape the

way we tell our stories.

Strategists: Media strategists, narrative architects, audience engagement. Help us

amplify our message.

Visionaries: Creative rebels, anarchists, thinkers, dreamers. Contribute your ideas.

6acchusman99@gmaiI.com

Dasgoharan – Why Is Maho Our Symbol?

Posted on 21/02/2025 - 21/02/2025 by muntjac

Content Warning: This peice contains references to rape.

This essay was written by a group of Baloch women called “Dasgoharan” and was published on
their Instagram page. It was later republished in e-flux Journal in May 2024.

On September 1, 2022, the commander of the police force in Chabahar raped a fifteen-year-old girl named Maho while interrogating her. News of this rape circulated along with the news of Jina Mahsa Amini’s murder by the state twenty days later. Then on Sunday, September 25, 2022, Molavi Abdolqaffar Naqshbandi, the interim leader of Friday prayers in Rasak, a town in Sistan and Balochistan (in the same region as Chabahar), released a statement confirming Colonel Ibrahim Koochakzayi’s rape of this young girl and called for a public trial. Five days later, after Friday prayers on September 30, 2022, the people of nearby Zahedan took to the streets in support of Maho and against the state murder of Jina. The crackdown on this protest was so violent and bloody that it became known as “Bloody Friday,” or the “2022 Zahedan massacre.” On that day, the Islamic Republic’s security forces opened fire on protestors after their prayers and killed at least ninety-six people. Islamic Republic snipers killed many of the protestors with shots to their heads and hearts.

This is not a scholarly or journalistic essay. It was written amidst the flames of anger and blood, and on trembling ground. It is not yet clear to us where the conflict between the military forces of the state/religion/tribe and the oppressed lower strata of society will lead. The outer hard shell of power does not hesitate to do everything it can to maintain the status quo and to suppress the anger of subordinate women and youth. The coming days are important. They will tell of the relentless but disorganized struggle of different assemblages of people who are socially excluded, especially women. This is a dynamic struggle that has always crystallized in the form of resistance in daily life and has often been ignored in the past. But today, it has come to the surface so powerfully that it is no longer possible to deny.

Maho’s tragedy showed us the basic conflicts of Balochistan society all at once and in the most naked form. Suddenly, society lost its patience and began to boil over. We remember that when Iran was burning from the fires seeking justice for Jina Mahsa Amini, a news item disturbed Balochistan’s cyberspace. A senior police officer in Chabahar had raped a teenage girl who lived in one of Chabahar’s villages. The rumor mill was abuzz as numerous confirmations and denials circulated. The judiciary and law enforcement authorities did not feel the need to respond. The person accused of rape was from the same official apparatus of repression that never felt obliged to answer for its crimes, insults, and humiliations, considering itself justified in doing whatever they pleased. Meanwhile, a well-known Baloch activist in Balochistan’s cyberspace publicly pursued the truth of the story through their network of acquaintances (while others did so secretly). While the official media remained silent, this civic activist made the matter public and spread information about the event. Soon after, he was threatened, forced to remain silent, and then arrested.

In a society known for its silence in the face of aggression, this level of scrutiny of independent citizen activists and their position was unprecedented. The general perception has always been something like: “It is Balochistan. The clan decides for itself. Most likely, the girl will disappear. The story is going to disappear similar to the rape of some forty women in Iranshahrin in 2018.” But society could not bear the silence any longer. Something had been cracked open. The wide understanding of discrimination, suffering, and the recognition of the people’s right to determine their destiny had changed. This transformation was particularly evident in the case of the movement seeking justice for Maho.

At first, the clergy remained “meaningfully silent” and called on the people to remain calm. Members of parliament and the official parties active in Balochistan shrouded themselves in silence, and no words came from the influential clans. The ruling Shiite central government handled this disaster similarly; this approach, of course, has become “normal”—a frequent occurrence in the territory of Balochistan. Perhaps a review of structural and historical discrimination in Balochistan will help illuminate the government’s approach to the violence that Maho was forced to endure and the movements that followed.

For years, the Shia central government has kept Balochistan systematically underdeveloped. The region has been deprived of justice-oriented programs through disenfranchisement and structural discrimination. For years, the central government has destroyed any hope for a better life and dehumanized the population with its centrist, hegemonic system of meaning. It has represented Baloch men as untamed violent brutes and its women as oppressed and powerless figures. Only people from influential and wealthy circles could improve their own material positions through complicity with the central Iranian state. Today, widespread poverty, high illiteracy rates, unemployment, and lack of identity documents for residents in Balochistan are no longer a secret. Baloch people have been a forgotten nation for years, and the proof of this is the increase in executions of Baloch people in the last two years without transparency or fair trials, which leaves no hope for justice for other crimes as well.

Despite this painful history and systematic elimination, the massacre of justice-seeking, empty-handed people on Bloody Friday in Zahedan exposed to Iranians more than ever before the magnitude of the oppression and discrimination faced by the Baloch people. The government, which shut down the internet in the days following the uprising, could not silence the voices of justice-seeking Baloch people and could not implement its old and outdated scenario in Balochistan. The Iranian government, which has always pitted the interests of non-Baloch native residents against Baloch people to advance its own interests, has now found itself unable to win popular support. The armed groups active in the border areas of Balochistan had been previously weakened by Pakistan and the Taliban, and this time, the government could not defend the usual claim that “the people of Balochistan are armed.” On that Bloody Friday, Baloch people had nothing but sticks and stones in their fight against machine guns, as evidenced by countless videos released after that bloody day.

The totality of these facts prompted people in other regions, with diverse ethnicities across Iran, to sympathize with and express their support for the Baloch in their protests and gatherings. These changes and sympathies promise new days, days that warn the government to be afraid of the transforming society of Balochistan.

For years, the Sunni clerical institution led by Abdul Hamid Ismail Zahi tried to institutionalize the oppression of women and maintain its base by fighting and negotiating with the government and clans. It still believed that Zahi has the last word and speaks for all Baloch. This institution had not dealt with this form of disobedience even when its support for the Taliban and Raeesi’s presidency had discredited the institution in the eyes of women and activists in Balochistan. Other Sunni clerics in Balochistan found themselves in a similar situation. Among all the region’s Sunni imams, only one was willing to listen to Maho’s family and to speak from an official platform about the oppression they faced before the street protests started. However, the people of Chabahar spontaneously took to the streets and gathered without invitation or support from traditional authorities. The first rally, which lasted late into the night, eventually led to the arrest of several people, including Baloch women, some of whom are still in prison. Even three days after this rally—that is, on Zahedan’s Bloody Friday—people did not remain silent and revolted in protest against Molavi Abdul Hamid. The statistics that have been compiled so far on the fatalities from this bloody day confirm the oppression already mentioned: many of those who were killed did not have birth certificates; some had a history of drug-related accusations and experienced humiliation in provincial prisons; some of them came from marginal areas like Shirabad, a neighborhood that is one of the poorest and most deprived areas in the peripheral regions of Iran. But because they were rebellious, they had to be put in their place by power. The response to Bloody Friday by the public pushed some clerics to try to dampen the anger by making statements in support of the demonstrators. This shows how the people were able to endanger the clerics’ hold on power and at the same time discredit the logics of the apparatus of repression without needing the support of an external authority.

But the Sunni clergy was not the only institution whose authority was shaken. The clan, another authority in Balochistan’s traditional society, also lost much of its credibility. The clan, which used to hold chieftaincy (khawanin) in Balochistan, largely lost its influence after the Iranian Revolution and with the spread of Islamism, when many of its chiefs fled Iran. This ancient institution, which could have been destroyed through the implementation of justice-oriented and democratic programs, returned to the political stage once again in the absence of a program for human development in Sistan and Balochistan and in the shadow of the repression of any form of civil, social, and independent political activity. Taking advantage of widespread poverty by exploiting problems of livelihood, the Islamic Republic has deployed and militarized the clan system. In order to control the borders and subjugate the critical and dissident Balochis, the Revolutionary Guard, with the help of the clans, have allowed much oppression of the Balochis, especially women, by arming the clans and handpicking their leaders. In the case of Maho, the clans have once again dashed any hope of legal action and abandoned the Baloch people. All these forces—the central government, the Sunni clerical body, and the tribes—have so far been unable to provide a response to the oppression undergone by Maho and the Baloch community. These days, government representatives are traveling to Sistan and Balochistan. They are negotiating or making agreements with imams, trustees, elders, and representatives.

The old forces are coming together to settle the crisis. But the Baloch, who have taken to the streets empty-handed, have scuttled these agreements. Now Baloch women have also joined the protest movement. In schools in remote villages, teenage girls are tearing up photos of Islamic Republic leaders, making statements, and writing slogans on walls. Society in Sistan and Balochistan is shedding its skin. What we witnessed in the movement seeking justice for Maho and the Bloody Friday of Zahedan shows a great change in the lower strata of society. Maho has shown us that as much as the reactionary forces have resisted our cries for Janin, Zand, Ajoyi (Woman, Life, Freedom), we Baloch have changed and are breaking new ground more than ever before.

References:

https://www.instagram.com/thevoicesofbalochwomen
https://www.e-flux.com/journal/145/606681/why-is-maho-our-symbol/

Anon – BUREAUCRAT DOGS’ ENTIRE FAMILY DIES ABOLISH ICE

Posted on 21/02/2025 - 21/02/2025 by muntjac

Sent in via anonymous submission.

BUREAUCRAT DOGS’ ENTIRE FAMILY DIES ABOLISH ICE

On the morning of February 21st, a banner written in Mandarin stating “BUREAUCRAT DOGS’ ENTIRE FAMILY DIES” followed in English “ABOLISH ICE” was dropped over the Sam Houston Tollway near Houston’s Bellaire neighborhood. This area is home several big Asian diasporas, especially a large Chinese immigrant community.

Across the Houston area, there have been many reports of ICE raids and unmarked cars patrolling the area. This is a recent escalation of violence against immigrant communities across the United States, where both fascist groups and government agencies such as ICE try to enforce Donald Trump’s rhetoric of mass deportations. We reject the militarization of our communities by government agencies who seek to rip families apart and intimidate immigrant communities.

In response, anarchist crews across the US are engaging in Black Cat Anarchist Network’s Anti-ICE Campaign, putting up pro-immigrant agitprop in multiple states. In Houston, non-white and immigrant anarchists dropped a Patriot Front banner that was “conquered, not stolen” months ago.

To us, Patriot Front and ICE are no different. ICE employs white supremacists as prosecutors and agents to oppress immigrant communities, while Patriot Front attacked “Occupy ICE” protestors in 2018 and consistently drops xenophobic propaganda across the country. With our action, we aim to oppose xenophobic rhetoric and shatter the illusion of passive acceptance of a white supremacist agenda in this colonial hell-scape.

Banner drops are simple and easy to do. In a car-centric city like Houston, you can easily share messages of resistance with hundreds to thousands of people as they sit in congested traffic on their way to work. It’s even better when nazis give you free materials for your banners!

ABOLISH ICE
CHINGA LA MIGRA
官僚狗死全家，废除ICE
DEATH TO FASCISM

Omar Aziz (18 Feb 1949 – 16 Feb 2013)

Posted on 16/02/2025 by muntjac

REMEMBERING OMAR AZIZ

Below we have listed three essays that reflect on the life and legacy of Omar Aziz. We are also happy to share this alongside his writing in English and Arabic.

Check his memorial page rememberomaraziz.net and a book being published containing the works of syrian revolutionaries, including Omar.

At the bottom of this page, we have collected some further readings some of you may enjoy.

Leila Al Shami – The life and work of anarchist Omar Aziz, and his impact on self-organization in the Syrian revolution

Source: https://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2013/08/23/syria-the-life-and-work-of-anarchist-omar-aziz-and-his-impact-on-self-organization-in-the-syrian-revolution/

Omar Aziz (fondly known by friends as Abu Kamel) was born in Damascus. He returned to Syria from exile in Saudi Arabia and the United States in the early days of the Syrian revolution. An intellectual, economist, anarchist, husband and father, at the age of 63, he committed himself to the revolutionary struggle. He worked together with local activists to collect humanitarian aid and distribute it to suburbs of Damascus that were under attack by the regime. Through his writing and activity he promoted local self-governance, horizontal organization, cooperation, solidarity and mutual aid as the means by which people could emancipate themselves from the tyranny of the state. Together with comrades, Aziz founded the first local committee in Barzeh, Damascus.The example spread across Syria and with it some of the most promising and lasting examples of non-hierarchical self organization to have emerged from the countries of the Arab Spring.

In her tribute to Omar Aziz, Budour Hassan says, he “did not wear a Vendetta mask, nor did he form black blocs. He was not obsessed with giving interviews to the press …[Yet] at a time when most anti-imperialists were wailing over the collapse of the Syrian state and the “hijacking” of a revolution they never supported in the first place, Aziz and his comrades were tirelessly striving for unconditional freedom from all forms of despotism and state hegemony.”[1]

Aziz was encouraged by the revolutionary wave gripping the country and believed that “ongoing demonstrations were able to break the dominance of absolute power”.[2] But he saw a lack of synergy between revolutionary activity and people’s daily lives. For Aziz it didn’t make sense to participate in demonstrations demanding the overthrow of the regime whilst still living within strict hierarchical and authoritarian structures imposed by the state. He described such division as Syria being subject to the overlapping of two times “the time of power” which “still manages the life activities”, and “the time of Revolution” belonging to the activists working to overthrow the regime.[3] Aziz believed that for the continuity and victory of the revolution, revolutionary activity needed to permeate all aspects of people’s lives. He advocated for radical changes to social organization and relationships in order to challenge the foundations of a system based on domination and oppression.

Aziz saw positive examples all around him. He was encouraged by the multiple initiatives springing up throughout the country including voluntary provision of emergency medical and legal support, turning houses into field hospitals and arranging food baskets for distribution. He saw in such acts “the spirit of the Syrian people’s resistance to the brutality of the system, the systematic killing and destruction of community”.[4] Omar’s vision was to spread these practices and he believed the way to achieve this was through the establishment of local councils. In the eighth month of the Syrian revolution, when wide-spread protests against the regime were still largely peaceful, Omar Aziz produced a discussion paper on Local Councils in Syria where he set out his vision.

In Aziz’s view the Local Council was the forum by which people drawn from diverse cultures and different social strata could work together to achieve three primary goals; to manage their lives independently of the institutions and organs of the state; to provide the space to enable the collective collaboration of individuals; and activate the social revolution at the local, regional and national level.

In his paper Aziz lists what he thinks the core concerns of the local councils should be:

the promotion of human and civil solidarity through improving living conditions especially through provision of safe housing to the displaced; providing assistance, both psychological and material to the families of the wounded or detainees; providing medical and food support; ensuring the continuity of educational services; and supporting and coordinating media activities. Aziz notes that such acts should be voluntary and should not be a substitute for family or kin support networks. He believed it would take time for people to feel comfortable outside of the provision of state services and adjust their social behavior to be more cooperative. Aziz believed the council’s role should be kept to a minimum allowing for the development of unique community initiatives.
the promotion of cooperation including building local community initiatives and actions and promoting innovation and invention which Aziz saw as being stifled by half a century of tyranny. The local council would be the forum through which people could discuss the problems they face in life and their daily conditions. The local council would support collaboration and allow people to devise appropriate solutions to the problems they faced including on issues relating to infrastructure, social harmony and trade, as well as issues that required solutions external to the local community. Aziz also saw a key role as being the defense of territory in rural and urban areas that had been subject to expropriation and acquisition by the state. He rejected the urban expropriation of land and marginalization and displacement of rural communities, which he saw as a method used by the regime to enforce its policy of domination and social exclusion. Aziz believed it necessary to ensure access to land which can satisfy the necessities of life for all and called for a rediscovery of the commons. He was realistic but optimistic. He noted that “it is clear that such acts apply to safe locations or areas quasi- ‘liberated’ from power. But it is possible to assess the situation of each area and determine what can be achieved.” Aziz advocated for horizontal linkages to be made between councils to create linkages and interdependence between different geographic regions.
the relationship with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the interrelation between protection and defence of the community and the continuity of the revolution. Aziz believed that it was essential to coordinate between the popular civil and popular armed resistance. He saw the role of the FSA as to ensure the security and defence of the community particularly during demonstrations, support securing lines of communications between regions, and provide protection for the movement of people and logistical supplies. The role of the council would be to provide food and housing for all members of the FSA and coordinate with the FSA on security for the community and the defence strategy for the region.
the composition of local councils and organizational structure. Aziz saw a number of challenges facing the formation of multiple local councils. The first was the regime, which repeatedly stormed cities and towns in order to paralyze the movement, isolate the people in enclaves, and prevent cooperation. Aziz argued that to respond to such onslaughts by the state, mechanisms of resistance needed to remain flexible and innovative. Councils would have to scale up or down according to need and adapt to power relations on the ground. He believed this flexibility was essential for the community’s desire for freedom to be realized. He also saw the challenge in encouraging people to practice a way of life and social relationships which were new and unfamiliar. Also service provision needed to be maintained and it was necessary to find a way to get an independent source of power in the face of cuts, as well as supporting the development of economic and social activities. For this reason he believed local council members should include social workers and people with expertise in various social, organizational and technical fields who have both the respect of the people and a potential and desire to work voluntarily. For Aziz the organizational structure of the local council is a process that begins with the minimum required and should evolve depending on the level of the transformation achieved by the revolution, the balance of power within a given area, and relationship with neighboring areas. He encouraged local council’s to share knowledge, learn from the experience of other councils and coordinate regionally.
the role of the National Council is to give legitimacy to the initiative and gain the acceptance of activists. It should seek funding in order to carry out necessary work and cover expenses which it may not be possible to be cover at the regional level. The National Council would facilitate coordination between regions in order to find common ground and foster closer interdependence.[5]

Omar Aziz’s work has had a huge impact on revolutionary organization in Syria. Whilst the mainstream political opposition failed to achieve anything of note in the past two years, the grassroots opposition movement, in the face of violent repression, has remained dynamic and innovative and has embodied the anarchist spirit. The core of the grassroots opposition is the youth, mainly from the poor and middle-classes, in which women and diverse religious and ethnic groups play active roles (see here and here ). Many of these activists remain non-affiliated to traditional political ideologies but are motivated by concerns for freedom, dignity and basic human rights. Their primary objective has remained the overthrow of the regime, rather than developing grand proposals for a future Syria.

The main form of revolutionary organization has been through the development of the tansiqiyyat; hundreds of local committees established in neighborhoods and towns across the country. Here, revolutionary activists engage in multiple activities, from documenting and reporting on violations carried out by the regime (and increasingly elements of the opposition) to organizing protests and civil disobedience campaigns (such as strikes and refusing to pay utility bills) and collecting and providing aid and humanitarian supplies to areas under bombardment or siege. There is no one model but they often operate as horizontally organized, leaderless groups, made up of all segments of the society. They have been the foundation of the revolutionary movement creating solidarity amongst the people, a sense of community and collective action. See here about Yabroud’s (Damascus suburb) efforts to organize in the absence of the state. Some local committees have elected representatives such as in Kafranbel Idlib, where a committee of elected representatives have made their own constitution (see here). Youth activists from Kafranbel keep the popular protest movement alive and have gained world wide fame for their use of colorful and satirical banners at weekly protests (see here). They also engage in civil activities such as providing psychosocial support for children and forums for adults to discuss issues such as civil disobedience and peaceful resistance.

At the city and district levels revolutionary councils or majlis thawar have been established. They are often the primary civil administrative structure in areas liberated from the state, as well as some areas that remain under state control.[6] These ensure the provision of basic services, coordinate the activities of local committees and coordinate with the popular armed resistance. Undoubtably as state provision of services has disappeared from some areas, and the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, they have played an increasingly vital role. There is no one model for the Local Councils, but they mainly follow some form of representative democratic model. Some have established different administrative departments to take over functions previously held by the state. Some have been more successful and inclusive than others which have struggled to displace the bureaucracy of the old regime or have been plagued by infighting.[7]

Whilst the main basis of activity is very much at the local level, there are a number of different umbrella groups which have emerged to coordinate and network on the regional and national level. These include the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), National Action Committees (NAC), the Federation of the Coordination Committees of the Syrian Revolution (FCC) and the Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC). None represent the totality of local committees/councils and they have different organizational structures and differing levels of engagement or non-engagement with the formal political opposition. See here for an interactive map which shows the coordinating committees and councils, as well as the flourishing of many other civil initiatives and campaigns in a country where such activity was previously brutally repressed.

A major threat facing these diverse initiatives has not only been the persecution of activists by the regime, lack of resources, the onslaught of the state’s attack of civilian areas and increasingly deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions. Some local councils have been hijacked by reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces. For example, in Al Raqqa non-local rebel groups with salafi/takfiri leanings took much of the power away from the local council. As they have tried to impose an Islamic vision which is alien to almost everyone, the people of Raqqa have been holding continuous protests against them. In this video here from June 2013 people are demonstrating against arrests of family members by Jabhat Al Nusra. The women are shouting “shame on you! You betrayed us in the name of Islam”. Throughout August 2013 the people of Al Raqqa have been protesting almost daily against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) demanding the release of hundreds of detainees, abductees and missing persons. Likewise in Aleppo revolutionaries launched the ‘enough is enough’ campaign calling for an end to rebel abuses and for accountability. This demonstration from June 2013 was held in front of Sharia Court in Aleppo after the killing of a child for allegedly insulting the prophet Mohammad. The people here are calling for the murderers to be brought to justice saying “”The Sharia Committee has become the Air Force Intelligence!” (the most brutal security branch of Assad regime). In Idlib people have also been protesting against a Sharia Committee which has been established, here they say “we are against the regime, against extremist killing and oppression” and are calling for the return of professional lawyers (independent judiciary) to the court (instead of religious men).

Omar Aziz did not live to see the often seemingly insurmountable challenges that would beset Syria’s revolutionaries, or the successes and failures of experiments in local self-organization. On 20 November 2012, he was arrested from his home by the mukhabarat (much feared intelligence service). Shortly before his arrest he said “We are no less than the Paris Commune workers: they resisted for 70 days and we are still going on for a year and a half.”[8] Aziz was held in an intelligence detention cell of 4 by 4 meters which was shared with 85 other people. This likely contributed to the deterioration of his already weak health. He was later transferred to Adra prison where he died from heart complications in February 2013, a day before his 64th birthday.

Omar Aziz’s name may never be widely known, but he deserves recognition as a leading contemporary figure in the development of anarchist thought and practice. The experiments in grass roots revolutionary organization that he inspired provide insight and lessons in anarchist organizing for future revolutions across the globe.

Notes:

1 Budour Hassan, ‘Omar Aziz: Rest in Power’, 20 February 2013, http://budourhassan.wordpress.com/2013/02/20/omar-aziz/

2 Omar Aziz, ‘A discussion paper on Local Councils,’ (in Arabic) http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=143690742461532

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 For a report on Local Councils see in Gayath Naisse ‘Self organization in the Syrian people’s revolution’: http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3025

7 Ibid.

8 Via @Darth Nader https://twitter.com/DarthNader/status/304015567231266816

Walid Daou – The Experience of Local Councils in the Syrian Revolution

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20190308203313/https://www.al-manshour.org/node/7415

Translated by Ghassan Makarem

“We are not less that the workers of the Paris Commune… They lasted 70 days and we are still here since a year and a half.” This is how the organic intellectual Omar Aziz described the revolution in Syria. On 17 February 2013, Aziz was martyred in Adra Central Prison.

This text will review the most prominent local councils, where Aziz played a major role in drafting the founding papers.(1) It will also point out the shortcomings of this type of organization, at least in terms of application.

The increase of the Syrian regime’s crackdown on the revolutionary uprising in Syria, in its peaceful phase, coincided with the desertion of many soldiers and the beginning of skirmishes between the Syrian army and what was to become the Free Syrian Army. The need arose for the creation of organizational structures to manage people’s lives, due to the withdrawal of the regime from its simplest duties, already begun with the implementation of neoliberal “reforms”.

While the Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) had been formed as organizational structures to prepare, call for, and document demonstrations, the idea was that the local councils would be an alternative to the regime and its institutions. According to Omar Aziz, the goal behind forming these councils was “assisting people in running their lives independently from state institutions…; the creation of a space for collective expression, which supports solidarity between individuals and elevates their daily actions into political expression…; providing support and assistance for new arrivals and families of prisoners…; providing a space for discussing livelihood issues…; building horizontal links between local councils…; defending lands in the area in the face of government appropriation to the benefit of the wealthy or military and security officers in the state…” This is in addition to the documentation of violations perpetrated by the regime and its thugs (only), as well as providing relief, coordinating with medical committees, and supporting and coordinating educational activities.

However, due to “the absence of electoral practice in the current situation,” as Omar Aziz says, “the local councils will be formed of workers in the social field and those who enjoy public respect and have expertise in [various] areas.” What is noteworthy here is how to measure “public respect” and when will “the current situation” end? Despite the continuity of the “the current situation,” local council elections were held on the municipal level and a general assembly of local councils, which included members of local councils, was formed on the district level. District councils were also formed and elected an executive office and a president. All these councils were attached to the Ministry of Local Administration, Relief, and Refugee Issues in the provisional government.(2)

In fact, however, the work of these councils was limited to municipal affairs, such as various services, accompanied (competing with?) a constellation of NGOs focusing on the same work. Armed groups remained outside the supervision of local councils. At the same time, the Syrian National Council, the Syrian interim government, and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition forces monopolized the “high political rhetoric.”

Thus, the original idea behind the councils became meaningless. Under the hegemony of weapons and conditional funding, the space for council work closed up. Thus, the possibility of building an alternative, democratic authority from below, which could lead the revolution and speak in its name, was diminished. Although these councils were chosen through elections, democracy cannot be limited to the ballot box or a few minutes of electoral practice. It should also mean that women are allowed to participate as candidates and voters(3). It should also mean being aware of racism and sectarianism. It means the participation of all people in running all their affairs, not merely those related to the right to food, health, and education, and away from the control of warlords from all sides. It also means striving to achieve the aspirations of thousands of Syrian men and women who demonstrated, got arrested, were martyred, or displaced. It should ultimately mean striving towards liberty, dignity, and democracy.

Syrian revolutionaries cannot be blamed for the outcome of the revolution. Omar Aziz did not detain himself and did not commit suicide in jail. From the onset, they faced a ruthless enemy, adept at killing at exploiting mercilessly. But this enemy was not alone. It was supported by a wide group of globally and regionally hegemonic countries and Syrian and non-Syrian armed groups. At the same time, Syrians were plagued with a leadership that was nothing but a pawn for the Gulf States and Turkey and begged for western intervention, until this “outside” intervened in favor of the existing regime, either directly or indirectly.

There is much to be learned from the ongoing experience of the local council, both negative and positive. Struggles by people, or humans, as the martyr and comrade Omar Aziz used to call them, are connected and interlinked. People devise their own ways of steadfastness and confrontation. Our destiny is to confront and struggle on various levels and front and to learn from the mistakes of the past and present. It is not merely to honor the dead, and they are many, but to celebrate life.

Published first in arabic on 6 March, 2017

References:

1) The founding papers for the idea of the local councils in Syria written by martyr Omar Aziz in late 2011 were published by Sami al-Kayyal on his Facebook page on 17 February 2013.

2) In March 2014, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces published the constituent by-laws of the local councils in Syrian governorates. On the other hand, the Syrian Nonviolence Movement website published an interactive map of all sorts of peaceful protests in Syria, including the distribution of local councils. The map needs updating, due to changes in the situation between areas recovered by the regime (Daraya and Aleppo, for example) or were taken over by ISIS (such as Raqqa, etc.).

3) Razan Ghazzawi, “Women and the Syrian Revolution,” translated by Walid Daou, Al-Manshour website, 3 April 2014.

Jwana Aziz – We Are Not Pawns, We Are the People Who Rose Against the Regime

Source: https://www.blackrosefed.org/aziz-we-are-not-pawns/

This article by Syrian writer Jwana Aziz reflects on the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Jwana examines the conditions that precipitated the 2011 uprising, the years of civil war, and the difficulties that now lay ahead for the Syrian people, while also holding open the possibility for a truly liberated future.

Jwana is the daughter of Omar Aziz (Abu Kamel), a Syrian intellectual and anarchist who both theorized and organized local democratic councils in Damascus during the uprising. In 2012 the elder Aziz was arrested by Syrian security forces and in 2013 succumbed to poor conditions in a regime prison.

Introduction

As I sit down to write, I think back to the last time I saw my father. Standing before me, behind iron bars, he was frail and thin, yet he smiled at me. I carry that smile in my memory. My mother and I stood on the opposite side, joined by the rest of the families visiting their loved ones. The divide was meant to be made clear. They, the prisoners, have wronged the state and were to bear the consequences for doing so. We, on the other hand, haven’t, get to walk out and roam free.

Today, I, and Syrians around the world, find myself in the midst of an avalanche of emotions, riding currents of joy, sorrow, hope, and fear, each one pulling me in a different direction. The fall of the Syrian regime was our collective dream, a longing we had aspired for, and as of December 8, 2024, it was realized.

A torn banner depicting Bashar al-Assad.

To effectively understand its descent, it’s important to first understand how he rose to power. When Hafez Al-Assad first seized power in Syria in 1970, the dynasty was designed to reign with an iron fist. During the first three decades, Hafez implemented a system built on capitalist cronyism and corruption supported by heavy surveillance and a militarized police state. This combination proved lethal to any dissent expressed against him and his family.

Consolidating Assets

Assad leveraged his position in power to monopolize control over all critical sectors, ensuring the state, under his rule, dominated nearly every aspect of public and private life. This included telecommunications, real estate, education, healthcare, and even marriage institutions. The 1970s saw a dramatic enlargement of the public sector, making the state the principal employer for Syrians. By 2010, an estimated 1.4 million Syrians were on the government payroll. This strategy blurred the lines between the Assad family and the Syrian state, making them virtually indistinguishable.

Cronyism

Assad’s regime ensured loyalty by cultivating a network of elites bound to the family through economic and social incentives. Positions of power were awarded based on allegiance, often favoring members of Assad’s own sect, the Alawites, along with close allies. This entrenched system of favoritism secured the loyalty of key figures in the military, political, and business sectors, further solidifying Assad’s power. The pervasive nature of their presence was underscored by the countless statues erected in honor of Assad and his cronies, symbolizing their omnipresent dominance over Syria.

Mass Violence, Mass Imprisonment

Perhaps the most potent weapon in Assad’s arsenal was the regime’s willingness to use unrelenting violence against its own people. This strategy reached its most infamous peak with the Hama massacre of 1982. In response to an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime unleashed a brutal military campaign. Known as “one of the darkest moments in the modern history of the Arab world,” the regime killed an estimated 10,000 to 40,000 people and destroyed large parts of the city. This event sent a clear message to the rest of us: any challenge to Assad’s rule would be met with overwhelming and indiscriminate force.

The Syrian Civil War, which began in 2011 under Hafez’s son Bashar al-Assad, further escalated this violence to an industrial scale. The regime used carpet bombing, barrel bombs, and chemical attacks to crush opposition-held areas, resulting in the deaths of over half a million people and the displacement of millions. Tens of thousands were arrested, tortured, or disappeared.

Nowhere is the Assad regime’s capacity for violence more evident than in its prisons. Among the most infamous are Tadmor (in Palmyra) and Sednaya, known as “The Human Slaughterhouse.” Sednaya was divided into sections: the “Red Building,” a site of systematic torture and execution, and the “White Building,” which housed prisoners awaiting their fate.

A 2017 report by Amnesty International, based on testimonies from former guards, revealed that after the Syrian Civil War, the White Building was cleared of its existing prisoners to make room for those detained for participating in protests against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Estimates suggest that about 157,634 Syrians were arrested between March 2011 and August 2024. Among them were 5,274 children and 10,221 women. Beneath the White Building lay an “execution room,” where detainees from the Red Building were transported to be hanged. Between 2011 and 2015 alone, an estimated 13,000 people were hanged there.

A poster reading “Freedom for Omar Aziz” in a demonstration for Palestinian prisoner Samer Issawi on Feb. 6th, 2013, in occupied Jerusalem [Courtesy Budour Hassan].

We have long known about the horrors of these prisons. In August 2013, a military defector codenamed Caesar, who recently revealed himself as Osama Othman, smuggled out 53,275 photographs, documenting the deaths of at least 6,786 detainees. These images provided an unflinching glimpse into the brutality of Assad’s regime. Today, the veil has been lifted further, confirming even starker realities.

Accounts describe unimaginable atrocities of rape, mutilation, defilement of bodies, starvation, and deprivation of basic needs such as food, water, sleep, and medicine. Torture techniques, some inspired by French colonial and German practices, included the German Chair, where victims were bent backward until their spines snapped. The Flying Carpet, a wooden board designed to bring knees and chest together, caused unbearable back pain. The Ladder, where detainees were tied and repeatedly pushed off, broke their backs with every fall. And finally, the Iron Press was used to dispose of bodies en masse.

Knowing these atrocities persisted for years is heart-wrenching. Syrians today are either still searching for answers about their missing loved ones, such as Wafa Moustafa, who is still looking for her father, or mourning the confirmed deaths of their family and friends. This week, Syrians have taken to the streets to grieve the loss of activist Mazen al-Hamada, whose death was confirmed in a military hospital. Mazen, a symbol of resistance and kindness, has an eternal place in our hearts alongside countless others who dedicated their lives for our freedom today: Razan Zaytouneh, Samira Khalil , Ghayath Matar, and all the brave men, women, and children who sacrificed for Syria’s future.

In a recent inquiry, Fadel Abdulghany, the head of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, uncovers evidence suggesting the regime is complicit in incinerating bodies on an industrial scale. “Where are the bodies?” he asks. As of yesterday, around 50 bags of human remains were discovered in barren land near Damascus, one of many suspected mass graves. Echoing Abdulghany’s call, I underscore the urgent need to know where the bodies have been buried, so Syrians can lay their families to rest and begin to etch their future.

Yet amid this darkness, there is joy and determination. Recent videos capture the release of prisoners, among them toddlers, grown men who have lost their memories due to horrific conditions, and women who gave birth in captivity to children fathered by men they don’t know. Despite the haunting realities, today is a day of hope—families are reuniting, and long-separated loved ones are embracing once again. The dismantling of Sednaya Prison marks a momentous day to remember.

Hundreds gather in and outside of Sednaya Prison after the fall of the Assad regime.

We stand in the wake of its downfall, the statues have been toppled, its portraits shattered. the cronies have scattered, the mukhabarat (secret security) dissipated. A family that hoarded wealth and plundered 90% of its people into poverty now finds its house an open one, where regular people walk in and take as they please—sweet irony, or perhaps a fit retribution.

But our celebration will be brief.

What Comes Next?

The vacuum left by the regime is being exploited by nationalist factions like Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an authoritarian organization with an Islamic fundamentalist ideology, and the Syrian National Army (SNA), a proxy for Turkey. Both HTS and SNA are seen as threats to a democratic Syria. And although the US and Israel did not instigate the offensive that brought an end to the regime, Israel opposes Syria’s liberation due to the potential risks it poses for Israeli control of Palestine and regional stability.

It is imperative, at this moment, we reject all forms of Arab nationalism and colonial entities rooted in ethnic cleansing and settler expansion—whether driven by Israel, the US, Turkey, or others. We must protect and ensure that we do not perpetuate the systematic erasure of ethnic groups including Assyrians, Kurds, Nubians, and Armenians.

It is now up to Syrians to dismantle hierarchal structures and rebuild democracy through “power from below.” My father’s work and that of his comrades demonstrate the ability of working-class self-governance through local councils. They thrived without the state, organizing education, hospitals, and services, all run by the people and rooted in their communities. Syrians are already coming together to restore the infrastructure neglected by the regime. Initiatives to clean and restore public spaces serve as a testament to our resilience and determination.

Unfortunately, the world, once again, stands idle, hesitant to offer the support we deserve. Today, as in the past, discourse seeks to limit Syria’s realities and the possibilities for change. We are framed as passive subjects, slandered with conspiracy theories, and labeled as pawns in a larger geopolitical game.

But we are not pawns. We are the people who rose against a regime we knew would kill us.

As I walked away from the prison on the day I saw my father, I stood on Syrian soil, supposed to be free—yet, I felt anything but. The feeling of being watched and monitored and the suffocating presence of fear was all too familiar. The regime’s grip was everywhere, in the streets, in the shops, on the roads, and in the eyes of the people. Syria, as a land, felt like one vast prison.

If there is one message I could share with the world, it is this: unless you and your community can determine your way of life, you are living within some form of prison. A carceral system that seeks to control and restrict our potential and imagination. If one of the most brutal dictatorships of the 21st century could crumble in a matter of days, then so too can the capitalist system that dominates and exploits our lives. We must be able to dream of that world, the way my father dreamt of Syria.

Jwana Aziz is a Syrian writer whose work has explored feminist social movements and the liberation of political prisoners across the MENA region. Her writing focuses on themes of popular resistance, grassroots movements, and abolition. Inspired by the legacy of her late father, Jwana reflects on Syria’s journey through its darkest moments and the resilience of its people.

أوراق التأسيسية لفكرة المجالس المحلية بقلم الشهيد عمر عزيز

Posted on 15/02/2025 - 15/02/2025 by muntjac

Taken from facebook, as there is no other arabic version of the text on a website we’re aware of, if there are any errors please send us an email.

https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=143690742461532

A longer version of this peice is avalible in English here; https://muntjacmag.noblogs.org/post/2025/02/15/omar-aziz-to-live-in-revolutionary-time/

It is also avalible as a zine in both languages on our zine page. You can order it here

أوراق التأسيسية لفكرة المجالس المحلية بقلم الشهيد عمر عزيز

آواخر 2011

ورقة نقاش حول المجالس المحلية في سورية / عمر عزيز /

مدخل: زمن السلطة وزمن الثورة

الثورة بحد ذاتها حدث استثنائي يبدل تاريخ المجتمعات كما تتبدل فيه الذاتيات البشرية. هي قطيعة في الزمان والمكان معا، خلالها يعيش البشر بين زمنين، زمن السلطة وزمن الثورة. أما انتصارالثورة فهو رهن بتحقق استقلالية زمنها لينتقل المجتمع الى عهد جديد.

دخلت الثورة في سورية شهرها الثامن ومايزال أمامها أيام من الصراع لاسقاط النظام وفتح مساحات جديدة للحياة. خلال الفترة التي مضت، استطاعت المظاهرات المستمرة أن تكسر هيمنة السلطة المطلقة على المكان. فسيطرة السلطة على الجغرافيا أصبح نسبيا الآن وإن اختلف نطاقها من منطقة الى أخرى ومن يوم الى يوم، ومن ساعة الى ساعة في اليوم ذاته. وكان لاستمرار التظاهر أيضا أن أنتج مجلسا وطنيا ضم طيفا واسعا من الحراك الجماهيري والتنظيمات والاحزاب السياسية، يعول عليه ليمثل شرعية تمثيلية بديلة للسلطة على المستوى العربي والدولي وليفعل الجهود اللازمة لحماية الشعب السوري من قتل النظام ووحشيته.

غير أن الحراك الثوري بقي مستقلا عن الأنشطة الحياتية للبشر ولم يتسطع أن يتداخل مع حياتهم اليومية. فهي مازالت تدار كما في السابق وكأن هناك “تقسيما يوميا للعمل” بين النشاط الحياتي والنشاط الثوري. ما يعني أن التشكيلات الاجتماعية في سورية تعيش تداخل زمنين، زمن السلطة الذي مازالت تدار فيه الانشطة الحياتية وزمن الثورة الذي يعمل الناشطون فيه على اسقاط النظام. لا تكمن الخطورة في ذلك بالتداخل بين الزمنين فهذا من طبيعة الثورات وإنما في غياب التلازم بين الخطين الحياتي والثوري للجمهور. فما يخشاه الحراك خلال الفترة القادمة هو أحد أمرين، ملل البشر من استمرارية الثورة لتأثيرها على أعمالهم وحياة اسرهم أو اللجوء الى استخدام مكثف للسلاح تصبح فيه الثورة رهينة البندقية.

بناء عليه، فبقدر ما تستقل التشكيلات الاجتماعية عن السلطة بفعل جهود البشر للفصل بين زمن السلطة وزمن الثورة، بقدرما تكون الثورة قد هيأت أجواء انتصارها. ولا بد من التذكير أن الاشهر الماضية كانت خصبة بتجارب متعددة تركزت على وجه الخصوص في مجالات الاسعاف الطبي والمساندة القانونية ونحن الآن بحاجة ماسة الى إغناء هذه المبادرات لتشمل المساحات الأوسع للحياة. فمزج الحياة بالثورة هو الشرط الملازم لاستمرارية الثورة وانتصارها. ما يتطلب بدروه تكوينا اجتماعيا مرنا يقوم على تفعيل التعاضد بين الثورة وحياة البشر اليومية. وسنسميه فيما يتبع “بالمجلس المحلي”.

ان هذا المدخل وما يليه ورقة للنقاش غرضها البحث في جدوى تشكيل مجالس محلية من أفراد يحملون ثقافات متنوعة وينتمون الى شرائح اجتماعية مختلفة تعمل على تحقيق التالي:

● مساندة البشر في ادارة حياتهم بشكل مستقل عن مؤسسات وأجهزة الدولة (وان بشكل نسبي)

● تكوين فضاء للتعبير الجمعي يدعم تعاضد الأفراد ويرتقي بأنشطتهم اليومية الى التعامل السياسي

● تفعيل أنشطة الثورة الاجتماعية على مستوى المناطق وتوحيد اطر المساندة

أما المواضيع التي تدخل في صلب اهتمامات المجلس المحلي فهي التالية:

الموضوع السكاني: توطيد الحميمية في العلاقات بين الناس

● توفير الدعم والمساندة للوافدين الى منطقة معينة او الخارجين منها

● المساندة اللوجستية لعائلات المعتقلين

● توفير الدعم المعنوي للعائلات المنكوبة والتكفل باللوازم والنفقات التابعة

وقت طويل مضى اختزل خلاله الزمن الحياتي للبشر الى زمن للبحث عن أماكن أكثر أمنا لهم ولعائلاتهم والانتقال اليها. زمن تحول فيه أيضا عملهم اليومي الى محاولات دؤوبة لمعرفة ما حل بأحبابهم المفقودين او الوصول الى سبل الاستدلال عن مكان اعتقالهم معتمدين في ذلك على أقاربهم او معارف لهم في المناطق التي يلجؤون اليها.

دور المجلس المحلي هو نقل هذه التعاسة التي تنضوي تحت زمن السلطة الى جملة أعمال يتفرد فيها المجتمع بالمبادرة. أي أن يقوم المجلس بالأعمال التالية كحد أدنى:

i. البحث عن السكن الآمن وتوفير المؤونة للأفراد وعائلاتهم الوافدين الى المنطقة التي يتواجد المجلس فيها بالتعاون مع نظيره في المنطقة التي غادروها

ii. تنظيم بيانات المعتقلين ونقلها الى الجهات المعنية في الثورة وترتيب الاتصال مع الجهات القانونية ومساندة الأهل في متابعة أحوال ذويهم في الاعتقال

iii. ادارة بيانات متطلبات العائلات المنكوبة والعمل على تأمين نفقاتها عن طريق الدعم المالي للجمهور و”الصناديق المناطقية للثورة”

أعمال كهذه تحتاج الى تنظيم وترتيب للمعلومات ومعرفة في فنون الادارة الا أنها ليست بالمهام المستحيلة على أي بيئة كانت. فالثورة التي صنعت جيلا من الخبراء في تنظيم التظاهر والاضراب والاعتصام تستطيع ان تدفع باتجاه تكوين خبرات ادارية لأعمال يقوم بها الناس بالفطرة.

ان مسؤولية كهذه لن تكون بديلا عن الأقارب او المعارف (أو على الأقل في مرحلة أولى) كما لا يجب أن تكون ملزمة بأي حال من الأحوال. فالبشر التي بدأت تأنس الخروج عن خدمات الدولة والتي وجدت بديلا مؤقتا لها في علاقات القربى بحاجة لوقت وممارسة كي تدخل في تماس وسلوك اجتماعي جمعي أكثر تطورا وفعالية.

موضوع التبادل بين البشر: تكوين مشتركات جديدة

● توفير ساحة للنقاش يتم فيها تداول أمور البشر والبحث عن حلول لمسائلهم الحياتية

● بناء ترابط أفقي بين المجالس المحلية لمنطقة جغرافية واحدة والتوسع في ذلك ليشمل الترابط بين مناطق جغرافية مختلفة

الثورة حولت ذاتيات البشربفتح آفاق حياتهم بعدما تيقنوا أن الصراع هو سبيلهم لاكتساب تحررهم واستبانوا من استمراريتهم فيه أن غدا آخر ممكن، وبعدما اكتشفوا ان لهم تعريف غير الذي عهدوه وقدرات من الابتكار والاختراع مختلفة عن أحادية قاتلة حاول نصف قرن من الاستبداد قيدهم فيها وكذلك أيضا بعدما اكتشفوا أن تعاضدهم فتح لهم أبوابا جديدة في تعاط اجتماعي غني ومتعدد الألوان.

يكمن دور المجلس المحلي هنا في تفعيل هذا التعاضد ونقله الى المساحات الحياتية التي تختلف بطبيعة نشاطها عن حراك مواجهة السلطة، أي:

i. تشجيع البشرعلى مناقشة أحوالهم اليومية (ما يتعلق منها برزقهم ومتطلباتهم الحياتية) وتداولها ومحاولة حلها جمعيا

ii. النظر في المسائل التي تتطلب حلولا من خارج الجمهور المحلي كالتمويل مثلا أو مساندة من مناطق أخرى

موضوع الأرض: اعادة اكتشاف المشترك

● الدفاع عن أراضي المنطقة التي تسعى الدولة لاستملاكها أو التي هي قيد الاستملاك

ان استملاك الدولة الكيفي للاراضي في المدن والريف السوري وما استتبعه من اعادة انتشار للسكان هو من الركائز الأساس لسياسة الهيمنة والتهميش الاجتماعيين التي اعتمدتهما السلطة. وقدعملت هذه السياسة على تكوين مناطق سكنية “آمنة” لضباط وصف ضباط الجيش أو تنفيذ مخططات تجارية لسكن الأغنياء ومناطق تسوقهم. إن الحراك الثوري الذي نشهده في المناطق الريفية والريفية – الحضرية هو بأحد جوانبه رفض البشر لسياسة الاستملاك والتهميش هذه التي تقطع مجالهم الحيوي.

دور المجلس المحلي هو الدفاع المباشر عن الملكيات التي تقوم السلطة بوضع اليد عليها تحت أي حجة كانت. ومن الضروري أن يقوم بالأعمال التالية:

● حصر سريع للمتلكات موضوع قرارات الاستملاك

● التواصل مع الشبكات القانونية للثورة ورفع القضايا امام المحاكم للاعتراض على قرارات الاستملاك لأجل إلغائها أو على الأقل تأخيرالعمل بها

● جعل الدفاع عن الممتلكات والارض مسألة تخص جموع السكان في مناطقتهم

تكوين المجالس المحلية:

● تكوين المجالس المحلية هو عملية تابعة لمستوى الحراك في كل منطقة، أي ان انه يكون أصعب التحقيق في المناطق التي تخضع لوجود أمني كثيف وأسهل نسبيا في المناطق التي يكون فيها الحراك الثوري أكثر تمكنا

● ان تحقيق أعمال المجلس المحلي هي عملية متدرجة وفق الحاجة والظرف ومدى تفاعل الناس معها

● ان النجاح الذي يحققه كل من المجالس سوف يغني تجارب المجالس الأخرى ويزيد من تصمصيم أفرادها

● لن يكون تكوين المجالس المحلية مهمة سهلة ولكنها أساس لاستمرارية الثورة. والصعوبة فيها ليس فقط الطوق الامني ومحاصرة البشر والمكان وإنما ممارسة حياة وعلاقات جديدة وغير مألوفة. يتطلب الأمر إيجاد صيغة مستقلة تقطع مع السلطة، يكون دورها مساندة وتطوير الأنشطة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية في منطقة تواجدها ويفترض أن تتمتع بخبرة ادارية في ميادين مختلفة.

● يجري تطبيق برنامج المجالس المحلية بدءا من الأمكنة التي يفترض فيها أكبر قدر من الشروط المناسبة. وستكون هذه الأمكنة بمثابة مساحات تجريبية لتكوين المجالس في مناطق أخرى تخضع لظروف أصعب

● نظرا لغياب الممارسة الانتخابية في الظرف الراهن تتشكل المجالس المحلية من العاملين في الحقل الاجتماعي والحائزين على احترام الجمهور وممن تتوفر لديهم خبرات في مجالات اجتماعية وتنظيمية وتقنية وتكون لديهم الامكانية والرغبة في العمل الطوعي

● يتم اطلاق أعمال المجلس المحلي على مراحل وفق أولويات المنطقة ويشترك باطلاقه:

○ أعضاء المجلس المحلي

○ نشطاء المنطقة

○ نشطاء يتطوعون من خارج المنطقة ويكون لهم خبرة في هذه المجالات

دور المجلس الوطني

ان للمجلس دورا مفصليا بالنسبة للأمور التالية:

● شرعية المبادرة: اعتماد المجلس الوطني لفكرة المجلس المحلي يؤمن لها الشرعية اللازمة لاطلاقها ويسهل قبولها من قبل الناشطين في الساحة

● التمويل: قبول المجلس الوطني ادارة “تمويل صنايق الثورة” – وهذه بحد ذاتها من الوظائف التي يتوجب ان يضطلع بها- يسمح بمرونة أكبر لاطلاق المجالس المحلية بتغطية وذلك بتغطية نفقات الاطلاق ومصاريف قد لا يكون بإمكان المنطقة تغطيتها

● تسهيل التنسيق بين المناطق ورفع مستوى التنظيم الى اطار المحافظات إذ أن كل منطقة وكل ناحية فيها مازالت تقوم بمبادراتها وفق تصورها للحراك. هذه الاستقلالية أثبتت دون شك مرونة عالية في الحركة غير انها تأثرت غالبا من غياب مساحات صديقة تحميها. والدور الذي يضطلع به المجلس الوطني هنا أساسي لايجاد أرضية مشتركة ولتوثيق الترابط بين المناطق المختلفة.

………………………….

تشكيل المجالس المحلية في سورية /عمر عزيز /

اقتراحات عملية لاستمرارية الثورة

مدخل: تلازم حماية المجتمع واستمرارية الثورة

أتمت الثورة في سورية عامها الأول ومازال أمامها أيام من الصراع لاسقاط النظام وفتح مساحات جديدة للحياة. خلال الفترة التي مضت، استطاعت المظاهرات المستمرة أن تكسر هيمنة السلطة المطلقة على المكان. فسيطرة السلطة على الجغرافيا أصبح نسبيا الآن وإن اختلف نطاقها من منطقة الى أخرى ومن يوم الى يوم، ومن ساعة الى ساعة في اليوم ذاته.

خلال الفترة الماضية، غيرالسوريون مسار مجتمعهم مثلما غيروا من تكوينهم الذاتي. وهم في ذلك، برهنوا على شجاعة غير مسبوقة وتعاضد مرهف وأكدوا بالتضحيات التي قدموها توقهم الى التحررواصرراهم على تغيير معالم حياتهم.

ولدت روح مقاومة الشعب السوري لوحشية النظام وقتله وتدميره الممنهج للمجتمع حالات فريدة من الحذاقة والابتكار وقبل هذا وذاك فعل محبة اسطورية لتمكين الحياة من الاستمرار. فتأمين المساندة الطبية وتحويل بيوت الى مستشفيات ميدانية وترتيب السلل الغذائية والتفنن المرح في النشرالاعلامي، أنشطة تحدت جميعها بغي السلطة وعبرت عن الغنى الانساني الذي حمله تضافر الناس وتعاونهم.

شكل نشطاء سوريون لجان التنسيق في بداية الثورة لتنظيم التغطية الاعلامية وتأمين نشرها وتوثيق فعاليات الثورة وانتهاكات النظام وما لبثت أن توسعت هذه الأنشطة لتشمل أمورالاغاثة والخدمات الطبية. وقد أصبح واضحا عندها أن التشكيلات الاجتماعية برمتها هي التي تتشارك وتساهم في تمكين الثورة من الاستمرار في مقاومة طويلة المدى. وكان لهذه المشاركة أن تفتحت عن علاقات جديدة قطعت مع سيطرة النظام على المكان والزمان في محاولة دؤوبة لتمكين الناس من ادارة شؤون حياتهم بشكل مستقل حيث أنهم تيقنوا أن هذه الاستقلالية هي عنوان تحررهم.

كانت الاشهر الماضية خصبة بتجارب متعددة وكان للتباين في التشكيل الاجتماعي بين المناطق أن حمل غنى في تنوع المبادرات واختلاف تلون تعبيراتها من منطقة لأخرى. ففي البدء كان الحراك الثوري مستقلا عن الأنشطة الحياتية للبشر ولم يتداخل مع حياتهم اليومية وكأن هناك “تقسيما يوميا للعمل” بين النشاط الحياتي والنشاط الثوري. غير أنه ما لبث أن تتطور التكافل الانساني عندما اقبل الناس طوعيا على المشاركة في المسكن والمأكل وتقديم العون بكافة اشكاله ثم توسعت هذه التجارب في المناطق التي كان فيها الحراك الثوري أكثر حدة ليصبح التلازم واضحا بين شؤون الحياة وشؤون الثورة.

وقد بدا جليا أنه بقدرما تستقل التشكيلات الاجتماعية عن السلطة بقدرما تكون الثورة قد شكلت العمق الاجتماعي لحمايتها وحماية المجتمع من بطش السلطة ومن الانزلاقات الاخلاقية أو استخدام للسلاح تصبح فيه الثورة والمجتمع رهينتا للبندقية. فمزج الحياة بالثورة هو الشرط الملازم لاستمرارية الثورة حتى انفلاش النظام ما يتطلب بدروه تكوينا اجتماعيا مرنا يقوم على تفعيل التعاضد بين الثورة وحياة البشر اليومية. وقد حملت التجارب الماضية مسميات متعددة للتعبيرعن هذا التكوين الاجتماعي الجديد الذي سنسميه فيما يتبع “بالمجلس المحلي”.

ان هذا المدخل وما يليه دعوة لتشكيل مجالس محلية من أفراد يحملون ثقافات متنوعة وينتمون الى شرائح اجتماعية مختلفة تعمل على تحقيق التالي:

● مساندة البشر في ادارة حياتهم بشكل مستقل عن مؤسسات وأجهزة الدولة (وان بشكل نسبي)

● تكوين فضاء للتعبير الجمعي يدعم تعاضد الأفراد ويرتقي بأنشطتهم اليومية الى التعامل السياسي

● تفعيل أنشطة الثورة الاجتماعية على مستوى المناطق وتوحيد اطر المساندة

أما المواضيع التي تدخل في صلب اهتمامات المجلس المحلي فهي التالية:

أولا) التكافل الانساني والتضامن المدني: توطيد الحميمية بين الناس

i. الغايات:

● رفع المعاناة المادية وتخفيف الألم المعنوي للعائلات “المهاجرة” نتيجة همجية السلطة

● التضامن النفسي والمادي مع العائلات المنكوبة بفقيد أو جريح او معتقل أو متوار أو التي تعرضت لخسارة معنوية او مادية

● تحسين الشروط الحياتية للعائلات

● توفير “أفضل الشروط الممكنة” لممارسة الدعم الطبي

● تأمين استمرارية الخدمات التعليمية

ii. دور المجلس المحلي:

تغطي أعمال المجلس المحلي كحد أدنى مايلي:

● توفير الدعم والمساندة للوافدين الى منطقة معينة او الخارجين منها حيث أن دور المجلس المحلي هو تحويل التعاسة التي سببتها السلطة الى جملة أعمال يتفرد فيها المجتمع بالمبادرة:

○ البحث عن السكن الآمن وتوفير المؤونة للأفراد وعائلاتهم الوافدين الى المنطقة التي يتواجد المجلس فيها بالتعاون مع نظيره في المنطقة التي غادروها

○ تنظيم بيانات المعتقلين ونقلها الى الجهات المعنية في الثورة وترتيب الاتصال مع الجهات القانونية ومساندة الأهل في متابعة أحوال ذويهم في الاعتقال

○ ادارة بيانات متطلبات العائلات المنكوبة والعمل على تأمين نفقاتها عن طريق الدعم المالي للجمهور و”الصناديق المناطقية للثورة”

● توفير الدعم المعنوي والمادي واللوجيستي للعائلات المنكوبة والتكفل باللوازم والنفقات التابعة: فحرب السلطة على شعبها ختزل الزمن الحياتي للبشر الى زمن للبحث عن أماكن أكثر أمنا لهم ولعائلاتهم. زمن تحول فيه أيضا عملهم اليومي الى محاولات دؤوبة لمعرفة ما حل بأحبابهم المفقودين او الوصول الى سبل للاستدلال عن مكان الاعتقال معتمدين في ذلك على أقاربهم او معارف لهم في المناطق التي يلجؤون اليها مما يتطلب:

○ التعاون ومساندة الجهات القانونية في الثورة لتوثيق الانتهاكات التي يقوم بها الجيش وقوات الأمن والشبيحة من قتل واغتصاب واعتقال وتدمير للممتلكات وسرقات

○ توفير بيئة محبة توفر الراحة النفسية والمادية للعائلات المهجرة وبشكل خاص للنساء والأطفال والتنسيق مع الجهات المعنية لتوفير معالجة الحالات النفسية والصحية التي تتطلب اهتماما ومتابعة خاصة

● ادارة الأحوال المدنية: تملي الهجمة الشرسة للنظام من المجلس المحلي القيام بتدوين الوقائع المدنية التي تخص النشطاء والمتوارين على وجه الخصوص. أما في المناطق التي حققت فيها الثورة حيزا من الاستقلالية فسيكون بالامكان مسك كافة الوقائع من ولادات ووفيات وزواج وطلاق، الخ.

● التنسيق مع لجان الاغاثة لتوفير الدعم الاغاثي والمالي بما فيه:

○ تحديد متطلبات الغذاء والدواء والمتطلبات الحياتية الأخرى

○ إدارة أنشطة استلام وتوزيع مواد الاغاثة

○ وضع البيانات الاحصائية ونشرها

● التنسيق مع اللجان الطبية

○ تحديد المنازل التي تتوفر فيها الحدود البيئية الدنيا لتحويلها الى مشافي ميدانية وتأمينها من أصحابها

○ تجهيز المشافي الميدانية بالتنسيق مع اللجان الطبية

○ التنسيق مع اللجان الطبية ولجان الاغاثة لتحديد المتطلبات الطبية والاسعافية والعمل على استلامها وتخزينها

○ متابعة طلبات الاسعاف وخاصة تلك الواردة من خارج المنطقة

● دعم وتنسيق الأنشطة التعليمية

○ تحديد المتطلبات التعليمية لكافة المراحل التعليمية

○ التنسيق مع الهيئات التعليمية في المنطقة و|او مع من تتوفر لديه الامكانية والرغبة في التدريس

○ ادارة وتنظيم الانشطة التعليمية

● دعم وتنسيق الأنشطة الاعلامية

ملاحظة: أعمال كهذه تحتاج الى تنظيم وترتيب للمعلومات ومعرفة في فنون الادارة الا أنها ليست بالمهام المستحيلة على أي بيئة كانت. فالثورة التي صنعت ذهنية معرفية في تنظيم التظاهر والاضراب والاعتصام تستطيع ان تدفع باتجاه تكوين خبرات ادارية لأعمال يقوم بها الناس بالفطرة. ومن الضروري التنويه ان مسؤوليات كهذه لن تكون بديلا عن الأقارب او المعارف (أو على الأقل في مرحلة أولى) كما لا يجب أن تكون ملزمة بأي حال من الأحوال. فالبشر التي بدأت تأنس الخروج عن خدمات الدولة والتي وجدت بديلا مؤقتا لها في علاقات القربى بحاجة لوقت وممارسة كي تدخل في تماس وسلوك اجتماعي جمعي أكثر تطورا وفعالية.

ثانيا) موضوع التبادل بين البشر: تكوين مشتركات جديدة

i. الغايات:

● رفع قدرة ذاتيات المجتمع على المبادرة والفعل

● توفير ساحة للنقاش يتم فيها تداول أمور البشر والبحث عن حلول لمسائلهم الحياتية

● بناء ترابط أفقي بين المجالس المحلية لمنطقة جغرافية واحدة والتوسع في ذلك ليشمل الترابط بين مناطق جغرافية مختلفة

ii. دور المجلس المحلي:

تغطي أعمال المجلس المحلي كحد أدنى مايلي:

الثورة حولت ذاتيات البشربفتح آفاق حياتهم بعدما تيقنوا أن الصراع هو سبيلهم لاكتساب تحررهم واستبانوا من استمراريتهم أن غدا آخر ممكن، وبعدما اكتشفوا ان لهم تعريف غير الذي عهدوه وقدرات من الابتكار والاختراع مختلفة عن أحادية قاتلة حاول نصف قرن من الاستبداد قيدهم فيها وكذلك أيضا بعدما اكتشفوا أن تعاضدهم فتح لهم أبوابا جديدة في تعاط اجتماعي غني ومتعدد الألوان.

يتمثل التحدي الذي تواجهه المجالس المحلية في ايجاد بيئة اجتماعية يأنس لها البشر فتكون مساحة مفتوحة لتبادلهم الطوعي وتمكنهم من تحقيق شروط استمراريتهم كأهل بتواز مع تحقق شروط استمرارية الثورة كمشروع ترق جمعي. ومنه، يعمل المجلس المحلي على تحقيق الأمور التالية:

● تكوين “ساحة اجتماعية” تمكن الناس من مناقشة مشاكلهم الحياتية وتداول أحوالهم اليومية وابتكار الحلول المناسبة لتحقيق توازن دقيق يضمن استمرارية الثورة وبنفس الوقت يحمي المجتمع حيث تشمل هذه المواضع كلا من الأمور التالية:.

○ الشؤون المحلية

○ شؤون البنية التحية

○ التوافق الاجتماعي

○ تحصيل ايرادات المنطقة

○ التداول في كل ما يتعلق برزق الناس ومتطلباتهم الحياتية والعمل على حلها جمعيا (قدر الامكان)

● النظر في المسائل التي تتطلب حلولا من خارج الجمهور المحلي كالتمويل أو مساندة المناطق الأخرى

● الدفاع عن أراضي المنطقة قيد الاستملاك حيث ان استملاك الدولة الكيفي للاراضي في المدن والريف السوري وما استتبعه من اعادة انتشار للسكان هو من الركائز الأساس لسياسة الهيمنة والتهميش الاجتماعيين التي اعتمدتهما السلطة. وقدعملت هذه السياسة على تكوين مناطق سكنية لموظفين وضباط وصف ضباط الجيش أو تنفيذ مخططات تجارية لسكن الأغنياء ومناطق تسوقهم. وقد جاء الحراك الثوري الذي نشهده في المناطق الريفية والريفية – الحضرية بأحد جوانبه كرفض لسياسة الاستملاك والتهميش هذه التي تقتطع المجال الحيوي للبشر. ومن أعمال المجلس المحلي هنا:

○ حصر للمتلكات التي خضعت لااستملاك

○ في حال استملاك الأرض لأغراض أمنية: جعل الدفاع عن الممتلكات والارض مسألة تخص جموع السكان في مناطقتهم

○ في حال استملاك الأرض لغرض السكن او لاقامة مشاريع عقارية:عمل ما يمكن لتحسين العلاقات مع الجوار والنظر في امكانية الوصول الى حلول ترضي الاستمرارية الحياتية لجميع الأطراف

ملاحظة: من الواضح أن أعمالا كهذه تنطبق على مواقع آمنة أو شبه ” محررة” من السلطة. ولكن من الممكن تقييم الوضع الخاص لكل منطقة وتحديد ما يمكن تحقيقه فيها.

ثالثا) موضوع العلاقة مع الجيش السوري الحر: تلازم حماية المجتمع والدفاع عنه واستمرارية الثورة

iii. الغايات:

● رفع وتيرة أمن المجتمع والدفاع عن المظاهرات وتوسعة امتدادها

● تأمين خطوط الاتصال بين المناطق وحماية حركة الناس والامداد اللوجيستي

iv. دور المجلس المحلي:

تغطي أعمال المجلس المحلي كحد أدنى مايلي:

● توفير المأمن والمسكن والغذاء لأفراد الجيس السوري الحر

● التفاهم والتنسيق مع الجيش السوري الحرعلى الاستراتيجية الدفاعية في المنطقة

● العمل مع الجيش السوري الحر على تمكين المجتمع من منطقته أمنيا واداريا

رابعا) تكوين المجالس المحلية وبنيتها التنظيمية:

يواجه تشكيل المجالس المحلية اشاكالات متعددة ليس أقلها قتل النظام وتقطيعه أوصال المكان واقتحامه المتكرر للمدن والبلدات مما يشل حركة الناس ويقيدهم في دائرة ضيقة للغاية. حيال ذلك بينت تجارب الثورة في المناطق كافة أن مقاومة آليات القتل ولدت ذهنية مرنة اخترعت باستمرار اساليب جديدة تجاوزت بواسطتها العقبات التي اعترضت رغبة المجتمع في التحرر واستطاعت أن تتفاعل مع ما يتناسب وعلاقات القوة على الأرض. ومنه، يتأثر تكوين المجالس المحلية بالعناصر التالية:

● تشكيل المجلس المحلي عملية مرنة ومتدرجة وفق الحاجة والظرف ومدى تفاعل الناس معها

● ان النجاح الذي يحققه كل من المجالس سوف يغني تجارب المجالس الأخرى ويزيد من تصمصيم أفرادها

● تكوين المجالس المحلية هو عملية تابعة لمستوى الحراك في كل منطقة، أي ان انه يكون أصعب التحقيق في المناطق التي تخضع لوجود أمني كثيف وأسهل نسبيا في المناطق التي يكون فيها الحراك الثوري أكثر تمكنا

● ان النجاح الذي يحققه كل من المجالس سوف يغني تجارب المجالس الأخرى ويزيد من تصمصيم أفرادها

● لن يكون تكوين المجالس المحلية مهمة سهلة ولكنها أساس لاستمرارية الثورة. والصعوبة فيها ليس فقط الطوق الامني ومحاصرة البشر والمكان وإنما ممارسة حياة وعلاقات جديدة وغير مألوفة. مما يتطلب إيجاد صيغة مستقلة تقطع مع السلطة، يكون دورها مساندة وتطوير الأنشطة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية في منطقة تواجدها ويفترض أن تتمتع بخبرة ادارية في ميادين مختلفة.

● يجري تطبيق برنامج المجالس المحلية بدء من الأمكنة التي يفترض فيها أكبر قدر من الشروط المناسبة. وستكون هذه الأمكنة بمثابة مساحات تجريبية لتكوين المجالس في مناطق أخرى تخضع لظروف أصعب

● نظرا لغياب الممارسة الانتخابية في الظرف الراهن تتشكل المجالس المحلية من العاملين في الحقل الاجتماعي والحائزين على احترام الجمهور وممن تتوفر لديهم خبرات في مجالات اجتماعية وتنظيمية وتقنية وتكون لديهم الامكانية والرغبة في العمل الطوعي ومن الضروري هنا التعامل المرن مع التركيبة العائلية في المنطقة و التكوينات السياسية الموجودة فيها

● يتم اطلاق أعمال المجلس المحلي على مراحل وفق أولويات المنطقة ويشترك باطلاقه:

○ أعضاء المجلس المحلي

○ نشطاء المنطقة

○ نشطاء يتطوعون من خارج المنطقة ويكون لهم خبرة في هذه المجالات

ومنه، من الممكن النظر في هيكل تنظيمي يفعل أدوار ومهام المجلس المحلي على الشكل التالي:

أي أنه من المستحسن أن تكون البنية التنظيمية للمجلس المحلي ذي طبيعة عملية تبدأ من صيغة دنيا وتتطور وفق متطلبات المجتمع وتبعا للتحول الذي تحققه الثورة في موازين القوة مع النظام في منطقة معينة وما يستتبعه من علاقة بالمناطق المجاورة.

خامسا) دور المجلس الوطني

ان للمجلس دورا مفصليا بالنسبة للأمور التالية:

● شرعية المبادرة: اعتماد المجلس الوطني لفكرة المجلس المحلي يؤمن لها الشرعية اللازمة لاطلاقها ويسهل قبولها من قبل الناشطين في الساحة

● التمويل: قبول المجلس الوطني ادارة “تمويل صنايق الثورة” – وهذه بحد ذاتها من الوظائف التي يتوجب ان يضطلع بها- يسمح بمرونة أكبر لاطلاق المجالس المحلية بتغطية وذلك بتغطية نفقات الاطلاق ومصاريف قد لا يكون بإمكان المنطقة تغطيتها

● تسهيل التنسيق بين المناطق ورفع مستوى التنظيم الى اطار المحافظات إذ أن كل منطقة وكل ناحية فيها مازالت تقوم بمبادراتها وفق تصورها للحراك. هذه الاستقلالية أثبتت دون شك مرونة عالية في الحركة غير انها تأثرت غالبا من غياب مساحات صديقة تحميها. والدور الذي يضطلع به المجلس الوطني هنا أساسي لايجاد أرضية مشتركة ولتوثيق الترابط بين المناطق المختلفة.

Omar Aziz – To Live in Revolutionary Time

Posted on 15/02/2025 - 15/02/2025 by muntjac

Also avalible as a zine by North Shore Counter Info check our ‘Zines’ page for the PDF, or our ko-fi if you want a printed copy.

A shorter version of this piece is avalible in Arabic here. Both are avalible as zines.

To Live in Revolutionary Time: Translator’s Introduction to The Formation of Local Councils by Omar Aziz

On 17 February 2013, the Local Coordination Committees of the Syrian revolution reported that Omar Aziz, prominent Syrian intellectual, economist, and long-time anarchist dissident, died of a heart attack in the central Adra prison. Held incommunicado by the air force intelligence since 20 November 2012, the big and warm – albeit ailing – heart of Omar Aziz could not stand almost three months of detention inside the infamous dungeons of the Assad regime. The reports of his passing emerged on the second anniversary of the Hariqa market protest, when 1,500 Syrians vowed for the first time not to be humiliated in the heart of Old Damascus. Aziz leaves behind a rich, significant legacy of ground-breaking intellectual, social and political contributions as well as an unfinished revolution and a country in desperate need for people like him. (Budour Hassan: Rest in Power)

Omar Aziz, revolutionary anarchist born in Damascus, was a friend and comrade to many and is fondly remembered and deeply missed. His text, The Formation of Local Councils, remains one of the core strategic proposals of the social revolution in Syria. He first published it in late 2011, and then released an expanded and revised version in February 2012 with a new introduction. This present translation offers the introductions to both versions and the full text of the second version. It doesn’t seem that Omar’s intention was to produce a static, finished text — with his emphasis on adapting to local context and changing conditions, it’s likely he would have continued to revise and change his proposals. You will notice some repetition between the two introductions, which is simply because the second was written to replace the first, and so they weren’t meant to be displayed side by side.

Although Omar’s name is somewhat well known, there has not been an adequate English translation of his writings. As well, the text was very much an internal document, circulated among people organizing in Syria. There are large sections presented as bulleted lists of proposals, and there is essentially no context given. The Formation of Local Councils was only published publicly online after Omar’s death in 2013; perhaps the lack of translation since then reflects the difficulty of presenting this important text to an English-speaking public in a way that allows it to be understood. However, the text is tremendously rich and offers many concrete ideas and reflections for those in western countries engaged in struggle against the state and reactionaries, and for autonomy and freedom.

This introduction will seek to provide some of the background needed to understand The Formation of Local Councils in context, and for this we will draw on texts written by Leila al-Shami and Budour Hassan. We will also share translated excerpts of the introduction to the French translation of Omar’s text by Éditions Antisociales, published in November 2013 under the title The Revolution of Everyday Life Under Sniper Fire. As well, we believe it’s important to situate this text within the debates and priorities that exist, broadly-speaking, within the anglophone anarchist world; this also speaks to some of the decisions made while translating.

Our hope is that by translating and distributing this text to make more visible the Syrian revolution, which has so often been denied or conflated with the armed groups that share its territories. Often leftists who support the Assad regime or anarchists who support the YPG/PYD will ask things like, “Are there really liberatory groups in these areas? What are their names? What are their ideas?” as if the organization of daily life needed a name, a website, and an English-language spokesperson to exist.

At a time when many activists were forced to flee, [Omar] chose to relinquish his safety in the United States and return to Syria to participate in the popular uprising that has swept through the country.
At a time when most anti-imperialists were wailing over the collapse of the Syrian state and the ‘hijacking’ of a revolution they never supported in the first place, Aziz and his comrades were tirelessly striving for unconditional freedom from all forms of despotism and state hegemony.
While most secular and modernist intellectuals sat on the fence and even denounced protesters for marching from mosques, Aziz and his comrades created the first local council in Barzeh, Damascus. The local councils, an idea proposed and crystallised by Aziz at the end of 2011, are voluntary, horizontal associations inspired by the writings of Rosa Luxemburg. This idea was later adopted in most liberated areas in Syria.” (Budour)

Without ever intending to, Omar’s life and writings can serve as an example of what we mean when we say “the Syrian revolution” — definitely not the official opposition in exile or the foreign-funded militias profiting off the war economy, as the above detractors try to claim. The Syrian revolution is in the formal and informal organizing that goes on in hundreds of places every day. As Leila al-Shami points out, in March 2016 there were at least 395 local councils operating throughout the Syrian territory, with practices and projects as varied as the people who compose them, but largely sharing a vision of self-organizing local tasks in what Omar calls revolutionary time — creating their lives outside of the time of authority.

According to Muhammed Sami Al Kayyal, one of Aziz’s comrades, “Omar Aziz stood for the complete break-up [of] the state in order to achieve collective liberation without waiting for regime change or for one ruling power to replace another. He believed that communities are capable of producing their own freedoms regardless of political vicissitudes.” Aziz recognized that the time of revolution was the moment the people themselves should claim autonomy and put in place as much of an alternative programme as possible. He again called for the establishment of local councils [in the second version of the text from Feb 2013], this time highlighting more roles such as coordinating with relief activities, medical committees and educational initiatives. Building autonomous, self-governing communes throughout Syria, linked through a network of cooperation and mutual aid, organizing independently of the state, he believed a social revolution could be initiated. (Leila al-Shami: The Legacy of Omar Aziz)

The Formation of Local Councils is fundamentally a strategic proposal. As Omar writes in both introductions, massive combative demonstrations had created spaces and times outside the control of the state. These demonstrations were often pushed forward by small affinity-based groups of revolutionaries called coordinating committees that operated clandestinely to avoid repression. In the space created, many forms of autonomous self-organizing began to emerge as the state withdrew or was driven back. The Local Council would serve to deepen and expand these practices of self-organization as well as share more broadly the organizing skills and experience of coordinating committees and other groups. Omar and his friends believed that the human energy freed up by creating these spaces outside of authoritarian control would allow for the creation of new social forms, which would in turn further erode the state.

Omar Aziz wrote about the importance of establishing non-hierarchical grassroots local councils that are independent from state control, and he did so long before there were liberated areas in Syria. When Aziz prepared the outline for the local councils, the uprising was still overwhelmingly peaceful, and most of the country was under the military control of the regime. At the time, he was mocked and ignored by the very people who would later adopt his idea and take credit for it.

Omar Aziz’s vision of the local council was founded on the premise that revolutions are exceptional events in which human beings live in two parallel time zones: the time of authority and the time of revolution. For the revolution to emerge victorious, it must break free from the domination of the authorities and become involved in every aspect of people’s lives, not just in demonstrations and political activism. (Budour)

Here, Budour translates Omar’s phrase as “the time of authority”, and our translations renders it the same way. Omar uses an Arabic word that could be translated as “power” to refer to both the power built up by people organizing their own lives, as well as to the coercive power that limits their autonomy. For this translation, we thought it was important to make the distinction clear: Omar and his comrades were not against power (they wanted to build grassroots horizontal power), they were against authority.

This emphasis on anti-authoritarian practice entered the text in subtle, linguistic ways too. Budour notes: “Omar Aziz avoided using the term ‘The people’ and instead referred to people as ‘humans’. His comrade Mohammad Sami al-Kayal writes: “He did not believe in ‘The people,’ that jargon coined by authority to maintain its power. He saw human beings who live, thrive, and spout their potential.” In the translation, in effect, the phrase “the people” does not occur — we translated Omar’s phrasing as “humans”, “human beings”, “people” (as in the plural of ‘person’), and “individuals”. Sometimes this leads to sentences sounding a little strange, but perhaps it’s necessary to break with common phrasing to break with common ideas.

We could make a similar argument about the word “society”. Omar is focused on specific projects that are adapted to local context – if he had a vision for all of “Syrian society”, it was of local, autonomous self-organizing. The word “society”, by lumping everyone together, is generally used to erase the diversity and possibility that would grow from the multiplication of these initiatives.

This quote from Leila is illustrative:

Aziz saw positive examples all around him. He was encouraged by the multiple initiatives springing up throughout the country including voluntary provision of emergency medical and legal support, turning houses into field hospitals and arranging food baskets for distribution. He saw in such acts ‘the spirit of the Syrian people’s resistance to the brutality of the system, the systematic killing and destruction of community’. (Leila al-Shami: The Life and Work of Omar Aziz)

Though we translated this sentence a little differently, we agree with Leila’s choice to use “community” here, whereas other translations have used “society”. It would be possible to translate this text in such a way that “society” was one of the most common words. However, we translated the Arabic word in question several different ways throughout the text to avoid what would be, to our ears, an excessive insistence on society. Because what is society? It is how the state sees the collected individuals, milieus, communities, families, political structures, classes, and so on that inhabit the territory it controls. An anarchic break with the state will also be a break with society, this non-free association of individuals held together by the shared experience of being ruled. As with “the people”, we believe avoiding the word “society” is consistent with Omar’s emphasis on “human beings” and decentralization, and so we’ve translated the Arabic word more often as “group”, “community”, or “collective”.

Omar insists repeatedly that what he is describing will vary based on local situations. He is not seeking to impose a model on all of “society”, but he does believe there is space for everyone to build a life for themselves and the people around them outside the control of the state on a non-hierarchical basis: groups of people adapting to local conditions with a shared commitment to collaboration and to not being ruled.

Omar Aziz’s work has had a huge impact on revolutionary organization in Syria. Whilst the mainstream political opposition failed to achieve anything of note in the past two years, the grassroots opposition movement, in the face of violent repression, has remained dynamic and innovative and has embodied the anarchist spirit. The core of the grassroots opposition is the youth, mainly from the poor and middle-classes, in which women and diverse religious and ethnic groups play active roles. Many of these activists remain non-affiliated to traditional political ideologies but are motivated by concerns for freedom, dignity and basic human rights. Their primary objective has remained the overthrow of the regime, rather than developing grand proposals for a future Syria. […]

There is no one model for the Local Councils, but they mainly follow some form of representative democratic model. Some have established different administrative departments to take over functions previously held by the state. Some have been more successful and inclusive than others which have struggled to displace the bureaucracy of the old regime or have been plagued by infighting. (Leila: Life and Work)

One of the biggest critiques to be made of The Formation of Local Councils and of the local councils themselves is that there is a current that seemingly favours bureaucratic, representative democracy. In a moment where many western anarchists are describing their projects as distinct from or hostile to democracy, it can be difficult to understand what moves anarchists elsewhere to push for local-level representative democracy as a form of governance. The local councils have not yet produced a cast of professional politicians, and in the ones we’ve heard most about in Aleppo and Daraya, the roles rotated often, had little or no coercive power, and the people holding them continued doing other kinds of work. But that doesn’t mean they would be able to avoid the pitfalls of representation in years to come.

Omar writes about the need to build administrative capacity to resume service provision, which can, among other more pressing concerns, include things like issuing birth certificates and recording marriages. We’ve read accounts of career bureaucrats joining the local councils in Daraya and busying themselves producing license plates with the revolutionary flag on them. The tension in the local council project that Leila describes above, and that Omar didn’t live to see arise, is the tension between social revolution and governing. Again, in practice, the local councils have been minimally bureaucratic, but not everyone involved sees them as a fundamental transformation of how people live, but rather as little democratic states-in-waiting. Obviously we still support these projects and think they’re beautiful and worthwhile, but we can’t ignore these kinds of tensions that arise in every mass movement when lots of people find themselves in the same spaces, opposing the same forces, but without necessarily sharing common goals.

And yet, there are fundamental differences between government and the local councils. The local councils as described in this text form by inviting people already doing important work, then slowly expanding to include more people in a wider geographic area as their capacity increases, while encouraging and making links with similar projects elsewhere. Their territories are defined by who participates, not by borders. And, unlike what some militias affiliated with the Rojava project have done, they spread by encouraging self-organizing elsewhere, not by conquering.

Omar helped found several local councils, including one in Daraya, which was one of the capitals of the revolution. Leila’s description of the revolution in Daraya can be found on her blog and is well worth reading, but here she describes its story as exemplary of the potential of local councils as well as the threats they face (written, of course, before the fall of Aleppo in late 2016, early 2017):

Omar Aziz didn’t live to see Daraya’s remarkable achievements. Nor was he able to witness other experiments in local self-organization, with varying degrees of success, across the country.
These local councils are not ideological but practical. Their first concern is to keep communities functioning in areas where the state has collapsed. They remain independent of political or religious directives, focusing instead on issues of immediate relevance such as service provision and food assistance. They work through the prism of their own culture and experience. As alternatives to state authoritarianism, their libertarian tendencies are undeniable.

By March 2016, it was estimated that there were 395 active councils in cities, towns and neighbourhoods, half of them concentrated in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. This estimate was made a few months following Russia’s military intervention to prop up the failing regime, which saw the loss of great swathes of liberated territory, placing these autonomous communities under threat. At the time of writing, other revolutionary suburbs around the capital are at risk of falling to the regime as a result of its “kneel or starve policy.” So too is Al-Waer, the last remaining revolutionary stronghold in Homs. And the 300,000 residents of liberated eastern Aleppo are under siege once more. (Leila: Legacy)

Omar wrote in the early days of the revolution, when areas completely free of Assadist control were only just emerging. As Editions Antisociales points out, “from the macabre perspective of the victim count of this massacre, which is almost the only “objective information” on Syria transmitted to a wider public, the first version [of the text] was written when there were ‘only’ about three thousand dead, and the second when the count suddenly swelled due to the shelling with heavy weapons of the first ‘liberated’ areas, such as the martyr neighbourhood of Bab Amr in Homs”. Omar only lived to see a taste of the overwhelming, one-sided violence that has all but swallowed up the Syrian revolution.

Perhaps the emphasis on democracy, administration, and society criticized above are pitfalls of organizing in a war zone against an authoritarian state that uses sectarianism as a key weapon. There was, and continues to be, an urgent need to create resilient social structures that can position themselves as an alternative to the Assadist state in meeting people’s needs. At the time, Omar didn’t see this as a burden, but rather as a revolutionary strategy. He, along with many other Syrian revolutionaries, had tremendous faith in the human potential that is unlocked when time and energy are freed from authoritarian structures. This is exemplified by the immense creativity and joy of the revolution’s early days, as it emerged from the smothering dictatorship. However, Omar writes that very quickly, time opened up by the revolution was filled up by a desperate struggle for survival — the regime’s ability to impose misery meant that this enormous human potential wasn’t able to manifest. In providing services and organizing people around them in non-hierarchical ways, the local councils hope to unlock this immense energy once again to defeat the regime and to rebuild new models of community (or even “society”). However, without outside support, the liberated areas have all too often been cut off and crushed through siege.

The main Assadist counter-insurgency strategy has been to transform a popular uprising into a civil war, forcing the opposition to militarize and favouring its most reactionary elements. Drawing on the analysis of Yassin al-Haj Saleh, we can talk about three tendencies within the Syrian conflict: revolution, civil war, and proxy war. All three tendencies have been present throughout and continue to be factors, but generally there was a chronological progression from revolution to civil war to proxy war, each of which also has forms of social organizing attached to them. The revolution is characterized by the local councils and their associated local self-defense groups that are more or less answerable to popular structures. As the conflict territorialized and large coalitions of rebel groups that were not accountable to grassroots formations emerged, the conflict increasingly became a civil war. The push towards civil war is strongly characterized by the power of counter-revolutionary islamist groups, especially ISIS and al-Nusra/Fatah al-Sham. Those groups then, in turn, became more and more dependent on their outside sponsors, and the political concerns of external states came to dominate; thus, the situation became the proxy war that currently confronts us.

However, just because the dynamics of civil war overtook the revolution, it doesn’t mean that revolutionary organizing stopped or that the revolution disappeared; in the same way, just because the proxy war dimension only came to dominate later on, it doesn’t mean that there wasn’t important meddling by other states in 2011.

A major threat facing these diverse initiatives has not only been the persecution of activists by the regime, lack of resources, the onslaught of the state’s attack of civilian areas and increasingly deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions. Some local councils have been hijacked by reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces. For example, in Al Raqqa non-local rebel groups with salafi/takfiri leanings took much of the power away from the local council. As they have tried to impose an Islamic vision which is alien to almost everyone, the people of Raqqa have been holding continuous protests against them. In [a video linked to on her blog] from June 2013 people are demonstrating against arrests of family members by Jabhat Al Nusra. The women are shouting “shame on you! You betrayed us in the name of Islam”. Throughout August 2013 the people of Al Raqqa have been protesting almost daily against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) demanding the release of hundreds of detainees, abductees and missing persons. (Leila: Life and Work)

Omar’s text only touches in an indirect way on the threat of reactionary counter-revolution, but the multi-polar nature of the revolutionary struggle became clearer around the time of his death. Though Omar was killed by the state, many of his comrades in developing the local councils were killed by reactionary conservative armed groups, notably the Douma 4 — Razan Zeitouneh, Wael Hamada, Samira Khalil, and Nazem Hammadi. They were kidnapped in a liberated area near Damascus by Jaish al-Islam, where they had tried to ensure that the local councils remained in control of the revolution and could act as a check on the armed groups. In the additions made in the second version of the text, we can see Omar’s increasing concern with this.

So we see, among other additions, a call to cooperate with the deserters who make up the Free Syrian Army, who had, in the meantime, rallied to the National Council which had “taken up the idea of local councils as its own”, as well as a dramatic call to establish more field hospitals. It was only five months later, in mid-July 2012, that the regime bombarded a rebel neighbourhood of Damascus for the first time. Abu Kamel’s (Omar Aziz’s pseudonym) project can only be understood in this frightening context […] (Editions Antisociales)

Omar’s position on the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and on the National Council is presented discretely but unambiguously in his text. He wants to collaborate with the FSA in order to ensure that the armed elements of the revolution answer to local, popular formations, rather than to defecting officers (and later, we could imagine, to foreign sponsors). The areas where this was most successful are also the areas that most successfully resisted the counter-revolutionary islamist forces — spectacularly, free Aleppo drove out first the Islamic State and, later, Jabhat al-Nusra. Similarly, Omar isn’t fully comfortable with the National Council, the official opposition in exile supported by western states; his vision is that power comes from the bottom up, so the only useful purpose of this higher structure is to co-ordinate fundraising, distribute resources to local councils (according to needs they define), and to promote and support the formation of councils. But if there was still hope in 2012 that the National Council would be at all worthwhile, that hope is now long gone.

The Formation of Local Councils should make it clear that the revolution cannot be resumed by the militarized formations, in spite of what every mainstream news source would say. Although not a pacifist movement as we would usually understand the term, much of the grassroots Syrian revolution does not believe that armed struggle is what will bring about a better life. Rather, it is the dual approach described in this text: destroying the state while producing new forms of life. Neither of those actions particularly require violence, but they must be determined and willing to defend themselves.

The revolution of “local co-ordinating committees” as it has been sketched out in Syria, doesn’t require any terror to reach its goals, it hates and abhors murder. It doesn’t seek vengeance, but rather justice. It is not a desperate attempt by a minority trying to squeeze all of reality into the mould of its ideals. It is the product of the actions of hundreds of thousands or millions of individuals who resolved to take their lives in their own hands and to go as far as possible towards their dream of freedom and dignity. And it is precisely this experience of universal importance that the Holy Alliance of its enemies tries at all costs to bury under ruins and lies. Bashar and Putin, the Iranian mollahs and the American congress, the pseudo-resistance of Hezbollah and the very christian Venezuelan police, the United Nations and al-Qaeda, the Communist Party of China and French know-how… The profiteers of the globalized system would rather transform Syria into a mass grave than willingly surrender their place at the table of those who divide up the world and ‘negotiate’ the future. (Editions Antisociales)

As this quote makes clear, none of the actors in the proxy war want to see a revolution based on local autonomy succeed in Syria, and ensuring continuing violence is the best way to suppress it. Revolutions are exceptional moments in time though, and even if they don’t last forever, they fundamentally transform the people who participate in them and open up possibilities for everyone around the world. Think of how much inspiration we still draw from struggles like the Paris Commune or the Spanish Revolution — the Syrian revolution is no less rich. As Omar said, “We are no less than Paris Commune workers: they resisted for 70 days and we are still going on for a year and a half.”

This brings up one last note on the translation. we have avoided referring to Omar, his comrades, or all the Syrian revolutionaries as “activists”, an identity that’s defined relative to a supposedly passive majority. As one friend pointed out, “You’d never refer to Durruti as an activist, or Louise Michel, so why would you talk about the coordinating committees that way?” It’s true, they have certain skills and experiences that are useful to the broader mobilization, but they are not distinct from it, nor are they leading it. Omar and those engaged in similar work created something vast and far-reaching, even if ultimately limited in time. Their commitment to radically doing away with the old world and dreaming a new one in its place is deeply inspiring, as Budour shows in this final quote:

Omar Aziz told his friends: ‘If the revolution fails, my life and that of my whole generation would be devoid of meaning… all that we have dreamt of and believed in would have been mere illusion.’ He passed away before seeing the triumph of the revolution and reaping the fruits of his majestic work. Syrians who are still alive owe Omar Aziz and the tens of thousands of Syrian martyrs a massive debt. It is a debt that cannot be paid with tears and moving tributes. Nothing less than fighting like hell for a free Syria would suffice. (Budour)

Cited texts

Omar Aziz: Rest in Power, by Budour Hassan, February 2013
budourhassan.wordpress.com

The life and work of anarchist Omar Aziz and his impact on self-organization in the Syrian revolution, by Leila al-Shami, published on Tahrir-ICN in August 2013
tahriricn.wordpress.com

The Legacy of Omar Aziz: Building autonomous, self-governing communes in Syria, by Leila al-Shami, published in November 2016 on Leila’s blog
leilashami.wordpress.com

Sous le feu des snipers, la révolution de la vie quotidienne (The Revolution of Everyday Life Under Sniper Fire), published by Éditions Antisociales in November 2013
www.editionsantisociales.com

Introduction from October 2011: Authority’s time and revolutionary time

A revolution is an exceptional event that alters the history of a society while also transforming each human being. It is a rupture in time and space, during which humans live two experiences of time simultaneously: authority’s time and revolutionary time. For a revolution to succeed, revolutionary time must become independent, so that people can collectively move into a new period. The Syrian Revolution has entered its eighth month and still has days of struggle ahead to topple the regime and open up new spaces for life.

Throughout the preceding phase, continuous demonstrations were able to break the absolute control of authority over space. Its control over the territory now varies, shifting from place to place, day to day, or even hour by hour. The continuous demonstrations also produced a National Council, which included participation from the popular movements, formal organizations, and political parties. It was tasked with being a legitimate alternative authority among Arab states and internationally that could incite the necessary action to protect the Syrian people from the brutality of this murderous regime.

However, the revolutionary movement has remained separate from day-to-day activities and so has been unable to enter into everyday life, which continues as it had in the past. It’s as though there exists a “daily division of work” between the tasks necessary to live in this world and revolutionary activities. This means that self-organizing in Syria is happening in two overlapping times: authority’s time, which continues to structure everyday activities, and revolutionary time, in which people take action to overthrow the regime. The danger doesn’t lie in the overlap of these two times, which is part of the nature of revolution, but rather in the separation between the progress of daily life and that of the revolution, for everyone involved. In the coming period, the movement will face two different threats : that human beings will get tired of the revolution and its impact on their material needs and family life, or that an increasing use of weapons will make the revolution a hostage of the gun.

Accordingly, the more self-organizing is able to spread as a force through the efforts of human beings to live in revolutionary time rather than in authority’s, the more the revolution will have laid the groundwork for victory. Let’s not forget that these past months were rich in all sorts of initiatives, especially ones focused on emergency medical care and legal support, and now we must urgently deepen these projects in order to take in broader spheres of life. Merging life and revolution is the key element for continuing the revolution and winning. This involves organizing for flexibility within social groupings by developing processes to co-ordinate revolution and everyday human life, which we will call here “local councils”.

Introduction from February 2012: Linking collective self-defense and continuing the revolution

The revolution has made it through its first year and still has many days of struggle ahead to bring down the regime and open up new spaces for life. During this past phase, continuous demonstrations succeeded in breaking the absolute control of power over space. Its control of the territory now varies, changing from place to place, day to day, and even hour by hour.

During this period, Syrians changed the course of their society while also transforming themselves. Drawing on an unprecedented courage and close cooperation, the sacrifices they have made show their desire for freedom and their commitment to collectively restructuring their lives.

Against the murder and atrocities of the regime and against its systematic destruction of community, the Syrian people’s spirit of resistance rises up with incredible skill and creativity, in an epic act of love that allows life to continue. Providing emergency medicine, turning houses into field hospitals, preparing food baskets, and finding creative ways to spread information : these are all actions that oppose tyrannical power and contribute to rich human relations based on cooperation and mutual aid.

Engaged people in Syria started forming coordinating committees in the early days of the revolution to organize media coverage, ensure the spread of information, and document both the accomplishments of the revolution, as well as the regime’s reprisals. These revolutionaries then broadened their activities to include relief work and medical care. It’s clear that these self-organized formations are collaborating and are contributing to a revolutionary strategy that would allow for resistance over the long term. This collaboration made new relationships possible that could break with the regime’s control over time and space, as part of the ceaseless effort to allow people to take autonomous control over their own lives, as they know this autonomy is what freedom is made of.

The past months have been rich with many projects to develop self-organizing, in a colourful diversity of initiatives and expressions that spans different regions and social groups. In the beginning, the revolutionary movement was separate from basic human activity and didn’t enter into daily life, as though there was a “daily division of labour” between the tasks necessary to live in this world and revolutionary activity. But popular solidarity developed, as people began choosing to share food and housing and to help one another in whatever way was needed. These practices spread throughout the areas where revolutionary activity was most intense, which made the link between revolution and life evident.

It’s clear then that the more self-organizing grows in power, the more able these deep social bonds will be to defend themselves and others against the repressive violence of the authorities, against moral slippage, and against the risk that the use of arms will slowly make the revolution and society as a whole hostages of the gun. Blending life and revolution is the necessary condition for the revolution to continue until the regime is destroyed. This in turn requires adaptable forms of social organization that enable a co-ordination between the revolution and daily human life. These efforts have been referred to in different ways, but here we will call these new social formations “local councils”.

The Formation of Local Councils: Main text from February 2012

This introduction and what follows are an invitation to form local councils composed of people from different cultures and from different segments of society that will work to achieve the following goals:

To support human beings in managing their lives autonomously, without state institutions or structures (even if this autonomy is not complete)
To create space for collective expression that can reinforce cooperation among individuals and that can encompass more necessary tasks as political engagement grows.
Incite social revolutionary activities on a regional level while unifying supporting structures

As well, the following issues are important and need to be addressed by the local councils:

1) Human interdependence and civil solidarity

Objectives

Relieve the physical and emotional suffering of families displaced by the barbarous violence of the authorities
Provide emotional and practical solidarity to families impacted by death, injuries, arrests, or disappearances or who have suffered other physical or psychological harm
Improve living conditions for families
Create the best possible conditions for medical practitioners
Ensure that educational services continue

Role of the local councils

At a minimum, local councils should :

Provide support and assistance to those arriving in a specific area or departing from it: the role of the local council here is to step in to alleviate the misery created by the authorities through actions arising solely from popular initiatives
Find safe housing and supplies for displaced individuals and their families in the area where the council operates and in co-ordination with its counterpart in the area they left
Organize the collection of information about arrestees and ensure its distribution to the appropriate groups involved in the revolution. Set up lines of communication with people with legal expertise and support families in following-up about the situation of arrestees
Keep track of the needs of affected families and work to meet those needs by creating solidarity funds and through regional revolutionary funds
Provide physical, emotional, and logistical support to affected families, make sure they have the supplies and funds they need. This war by the authorities against people has transformed the time they would have spent living into time spent looking for safer shelter for themselves and their families. It has transformed their daily work into an endless search for information about their loved ones who have dissapeared, to figure out where they are being held, with only the support of their families or the people they happen to know in the area where they took refuge. It is therefore necessary to:
- Support and collaborate with revolutionary individuals and groups with legal expertise to document abuses carried out by the army, by the intelligence agencies, and by the shabbiha [informal enforcers], such as murder, rape, arrest, property destruction, and theft.
- Provide a caring environment that allows for less psychological and material stress for displaced families, especially for women and children. Coordinate with skilled providers to ensure support for physical and psychological health, especially for those who need the most attention.
Civil administration: Because of the ferocious regime attacks, it falls to the local councils to create administrative records for those who struggle against the regime, especially those who have gone underground. And in those areas where the revolution has gained some independence, they could even begin registering births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and so on.
Co-ordinate with relief organizations to provide humanitarian and financial aid, in particular:
- Identify food and medical needs, as well as any other necessities of life
- Organize to receive and distribute aid
- Compile and spread statistical data
Co-ordinate with medical committees
- Identify homes suitable to be turned into field hospitals and organize their defense alongside their owners
- Prepare the field hospitals in coordination with the medical committees
- With medical and aid groups, identify the needed medical supplies and training, and work to receive and store those supplies
- Follow-up on responses to emergencies, especially those coming from outside the area
Support and help coordinate educational initiatives
- Identify the educational requirements at all levels
- Co-ordinate with educational institutions in the area and with anyone who is able and willing to teach
- Organize and administrate educational activities
Support and co-ordinate outreach initiatives

Note: Such work requires organization and knowledge of the arts of administration, but these above tasks are not impossible, whatever the environment may be. This revolution has produced many people skilled at the organization of demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins, and so it can also push to create experts in the fields in which people have already engaged spontaneously. But let’s also remember that projects like these are not meant to replace family and friendship bonds (at least not at first) and under no circumstances should there be any coercion to participate. Humans who have begun learning to live without services provided by the state and who have found temporary replacements for them through family relationships will need time and practice to integrate themselves into a broader social sphere that’s more effective and elaborate.

2) On relationships between individuals: Creating new common interests

Objectives

Increase the capacity for action and initiative by individuals in the social body
Create spaces for discussion of human concerns and of solutions to problems of daily life
Build horizontal relationships of interdependence between local councils in a given region and broaden these to include other geographic areas

Role of the local councils: What should be, at a minimum, the local council’s work

The revolution has transformed individual humans by opening up new horizons in their lives, particularly once they were sure that confrontation was the way to gain their freedom and that by continuing on this path they would find new possibilities for tomorrow. By developing new ways of defining themselves rich with innovative, inventive power, they were able to overcome the smothering individualism of a half-century of authoritarian rule. They discovered that mutual aid pushes open the doors to exciting and colourful social richness.

The challenge facing the local councils consists of making people comfortable with this social environment, by creating open space for free dialogue. This is necessary for achieving ongoing, friendly relations while also securing the future of the revolution as a collective project. Towards this end, the local councils will pursue these goals:

Form “social spaces” that allow people to discuss the difficulties in their daily lives, debate what is needed, and develop appropriate solutions. To keep the delicate balance between the continuation of the revolution and the protection of those around them, these solutions will have to consider the following points:
- Local concerns
- Infrastructural concerns
- Social harmony
- Regional fundraising
- Delve into all issues relating to people’s livelihoods and their expectations for life and work and find collective solutions wherever possible
Analyze questions that demand solutions beyond the local context, such as funding or support for other regions
Defend the land in the region from being expropriated by the state, because such expropriations of land in Syria’s cities and countryside and the consequent displacement of their inhabitants are one of the core pillars of the politic of domination and social exclusion on which the regime relies. This policy was adopted to create residential areas for government employees and soldiers and officers of the army, or in the name of business, to create shopping centres for the rich. In rural and suburban areas, the revolutionary movement formed partly as a rejection of this policy of expropriation and exclusion that cuts human beings off from their subsistence base. The work of the local committees is then’:
- Inventory the lands affected by expropriation
- In the event of expropriation of land for security purposes: support the local residents in defending the land and property in their region
- In the event of expropriations of land for residential purposes or other development projects: do what you can to preserve good relationships with the local residents and seek a solution that meets the needs of all parties

Note: Clearly, these kinds of actions are only possible in areas that are secure or nearly “liberated” from the authorities. But its possible to carry out plans specific to an area that take into account what’s possible there.

3) On the relationship with the Free Syrian Army: The need to protect communities while continuing the revolution

Objectives

Make the people around us safer and protect demonstration so that they can expand to new areas
Ensure lines of communication between regions by protecting the movement of people and providing logistical support

Role of the local councils: What should be, at a minimum, the local council’s work

Provide safe housing and supplies to members of the Free Syrian Army
Coordinate and build consensus with the Free Syrian Army on strategies for the defence of the region
Work with the Free Syrian Army to empower people in the area to take charge of security and administration

4) On the formation of local councils and their organizational structure

The process of forming local councils faces many obstacles, not the least of which are the deadly violence of the regime, how areas are cut off from each other, the frequent raids cities and villages. Each of these factors greatly limit the ability of people to move around and shut them into closed circles. Confronted with this, the revolution has demonstrated in every region that mechanisms to resist these killings give rise to adaptability and creativity. They also contribute to new practices aimed at overcoming the limits put on peoples collective dreams for freedom and that are able to react appropriately to the shifting balance of power on the ground. Therefore, the formation of local councils is influenced by the following factors:

The formation of local councils is a dynamic process that responds to the needs of the situation and how people engage with it
Every success achieved by one council will contribute to the efforts of the others and will increase the determination of all their members
The formation of local councils will vary based on the intensity of the movement in a given region, meaning it will be more difficult in those areas subjected to a heavy presence of security forces and easier in areas where the revolutionary movement has more capacity
This important process of creating local councils will not be easy, but it’s critical if the revolution is to continue. It’s hard not only because of the security deployment and the sieges targeting communities and areas, but also because it involves trying new and unconventional ways of living and relating to one another. This requires becoming independent while breaking with authority, so the role of the councils is to support and develop economic and social activities in their area, based on administrative experience in different domains.
In light of the difficulties involved in organizing elections under current circumstances, the local councils will consist of those whose social engagement has earned them wide respect, on the basis of their social and technical skills and their organizing experience. They should have the capacity and desire to work as volunteers, as well as the adaptability necessary to engage with the family structures or political groupings present in an area
The activities of the local councils develop in stages according to local priorities. From the beginning, the following people will be involved:
- Members of the local council
- Engaged people from the region
- Willing people participating outside the region with expertise in the questions at hand

Taken together, this all lets us imagine an organizational structure that could take on the tasks of the local council. Ideally, the council should organize on a practical basis, starting small and developing further according to the needs of the community. This organizing will also change in accordance with the transformations brought about by the revolution to the balance of power with the regime in specific areas and what this entails for relationships with neighbouring areas.

5) The role of the National Council

The Council plays a pivotal role in the following matters:

The legitimacy of the initiative: By adopting the idea of local councils, the National Council helps give them the legitimacy they need to develop and it contributes to their acceptance by other people engaged on the ground
Funding: The National Council has agreed to take on the administration of “the revolutionary funds”, a necessary role that allows for greater flexibility in launching local councils by covering initial costs as well as later expenses that could not be covered locally
The National Council can facilitate organizing between areas and increase the level of organization on the provincial level, while each region and locality continues to engage in projects in line with their idea of the movement. This independence has clearly given the movement its tremendous adaptability, even though it was often affected by the lack of supportive spaces to protect it. The role of the National Council here is important for finding common ground and strengthening collaboration between different areas

A Note on the Text

The above translation includes the introduction to the version of Omar’s text published in October 2011 and the full text of the version he released in February 2012. These works were not published online until after his death at the hands of the regime in February 2013. It is based on the Arabic text found here: https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=143690742461532

This translation drew on a rough English translation of the first version of Omar’s text by Yasmeen Mobayed found on muqawameh.wordpress.com and on the French translation published by Éditions Antisociales in 2013: http://editionsantisociales.com/AbouKamel.php

To Live in Revolutionary Time: Translator’s Introduction to The Formation of Local Councils by Omar Aziz

On 17 February 2013, the Local Coordination Committees of the Syrian revolution reported that Omar Aziz, prominent Syrian intellectual, economist, and long-time anarchist dissident, died of a heart attack in the central Adra prison. Held incommunicado by the air force intelligence since 20 November 2012, the big and warm – albeit ailing – heart of Omar Aziz could not stand almost three months of detention inside the infamous dungeons of the Assad regime. The reports of his passing emerged on the second anniversary of the Hariqa market protest, when 1,500 Syrians vowed for the first time not to be humiliated in the heart of Old Damascus. Aziz leaves behind a rich, significant legacy of ground-breaking intellectual, social and political contributions as well as an unfinished revolution and a country in desperate need for people like him. (Budour Hassan: Rest in Power)

Omar Aziz, revolutionary anarchist born in Damascus, was a friend and comrade to many and is fondly remembered and deeply missed. His text, The Formation of Local Councils, remains one of the core strategic proposals of the social revolution in Syria. He first published it in late 2011, and then released an expanded and revised version in February 2012 with a new introduction. This present translation offers the introductions to both versions and the full text of the second version. It doesn’t seem that Omar’s intention was to produce a static, finished text — with his emphasis on adapting to local context and changing conditions, it’s likely he would have continued to revise and change his proposals. You will notice some repetition between the two introductions, which is simply because the second was written to replace the first, and so they weren’t meant to be displayed side by side.

Although Omar’s name is somewhat well known, there has not been an adequate English translation of his writings. As well, the text was very much an internal document, circulated among people organizing in Syria. There are large sections presented as bulleted lists of proposals, and there is essentially no context given. The Formation of Local Councils was only published publicly online after Omar’s death in 2013; perhaps the lack of translation since then reflects the difficulty of presenting this important text to an English-speaking public in a way that allows it to be understood. However, the text is tremendously rich and offers many concrete ideas and reflections for those in western countries engaged in struggle against the state and reactionaries, and for autonomy and freedom.

This introduction will seek to provide some of the background needed to understand The Formation of Local Councils in context, and for this we will draw on texts written by Leila al-Shami and Budour Hassan. We will also share translated excerpts of the introduction to the French translation of Omar’s text by Éditions Antisociales, published in November 2013 under the title The Revolution of Everyday Life Under Sniper Fire. As well, we believe it’s important to situate this text within the debates and priorities that exist, broadly-speaking, within the anglophone anarchist world; this also speaks to some of the decisions made while translating.

Our hope is that by translating and distributing this text to make more visible the Syrian revolution, which has so often been denied or conflated with the armed groups that share its territories. Often leftists who support the Assad regime or anarchists who support the YPG/PYD will ask things like, “Are there really liberatory groups in these areas? What are their names? What are their ideas?” as if the organization of daily life needed a name, a website, and an English-language spokesperson to exist.

At a time when many activists were forced to flee, [Omar] chose to relinquish his safety in the United States and return to Syria to participate in the popular uprising that has swept through the country.
At a time when most anti-imperialists were wailing over the collapse of the Syrian state and the ‘hijacking’ of a revolution they never supported in the first place, Aziz and his comrades were tirelessly striving for unconditional freedom from all forms of despotism and state hegemony.
While most secular and modernist intellectuals sat on the fence and even denounced protesters for marching from mosques, Aziz and his comrades created the first local council in Barzeh, Damascus. The local councils, an idea proposed and crystallised by Aziz at the end of 2011, are voluntary, horizontal associations inspired by the writings of Rosa Luxemburg. This idea was later adopted in most liberated areas in Syria.” (Budour)

Without ever intending to, Omar’s life and writings can serve as an example of what we mean when we say “the Syrian revolution” — definitely not the official opposition in exile or the foreign-funded militias profiting off the war economy, as the above detractors try to claim. The Syrian revolution is in the formal and informal organizing that goes on in hundreds of places every day. As Leila al-Shami points out, in March 2016 there were at least 395 local councils operating throughout the Syrian territory, with practices and projects as varied as the people who compose them, but largely sharing a vision of self-organizing local tasks in what Omar calls revolutionary time — creating their lives outside of the time of authority.

According to Muhammed Sami Al Kayyal, one of Aziz’s comrades, “Omar Aziz stood for the complete break-up [of] the state in order to achieve collective liberation without waiting for regime change or for one ruling power to replace another. He believed that communities are capable of producing their own freedoms regardless of political vicissitudes.” Aziz recognized that the time of revolution was the moment the people themselves should claim autonomy and put in place as much of an alternative programme as possible. He again called for the establishment of local councils [in the second version of the text from Feb 2013], this time highlighting more roles such as coordinating with relief activities, medical committees and educational initiatives. Building autonomous, self-governing communes throughout Syria, linked through a network of cooperation and mutual aid, organizing independently of the state, he believed a social revolution could be initiated. (Leila al-Shami: The Legacy of Omar Aziz)

The Formation of Local Councils is fundamentally a strategic proposal. As Omar writes in both introductions, massive combative demonstrations had created spaces and times outside the control of the state. These demonstrations were often pushed forward by small affinity-based groups of revolutionaries called coordinating committees that operated clandestinely to avoid repression. In the space created, many forms of autonomous self-organizing began to emerge as the state withdrew or was driven back. The Local Council would serve to deepen and expand these practices of self-organization as well as share more broadly the organizing skills and experience of coordinating committees and other groups. Omar and his friends believed that the human energy freed up by creating these spaces outside of authoritarian control would allow for the creation of new social forms, which would in turn further erode the state.

Omar Aziz wrote about the importance of establishing non-hierarchical grassroots local councils that are independent from state control, and he did so long before there were liberated areas in Syria. When Aziz prepared the outline for the local councils, the uprising was still overwhelmingly peaceful, and most of the country was under the military control of the regime. At the time, he was mocked and ignored by the very people who would later adopt his idea and take credit for it.

Omar Aziz’s vision of the local council was founded on the premise that revolutions are exceptional events in which human beings live in two parallel time zones: the time of authority and the time of revolution. For the revolution to emerge victorious, it must break free from the domination of the authorities and become involved in every aspect of people’s lives, not just in demonstrations and political activism. (Budour)

Here, Budour translates Omar’s phrase as “the time of authority”, and our translations renders it the same way. Omar uses an Arabic word that could be translated as “power” to refer to both the power built up by people organizing their own lives, as well as to the coercive power that limits their autonomy. For this translation, we thought it was important to make the distinction clear: Omar and his comrades were not against power (they wanted to build grassroots horizontal power), they were against authority.

This emphasis on anti-authoritarian practice entered the text in subtle, linguistic ways too. Budour notes: “Omar Aziz avoided using the term ‘The people’ and instead referred to people as ‘humans’. His comrade Mohammad Sami al-Kayal writes: “He did not believe in ‘The people,’ that jargon coined by authority to maintain its power. He saw human beings who live, thrive, and spout their potential.” In the translation, in effect, the phrase “the people” does not occur — we translated Omar’s phrasing as “humans”, “human beings”, “people” (as in the plural of ‘person’), and “individuals”. Sometimes this leads to sentences sounding a little strange, but perhaps it’s necessary to break with common phrasing to break with common ideas.

We could make a similar argument about the word “society”. Omar is focused on specific projects that are adapted to local context – if he had a vision for all of “Syrian society”, it was of local, autonomous self-organizing. The word “society”, by lumping everyone together, is generally used to erase the diversity and possibility that would grow from the multiplication of these initiatives.

This quote from Leila is illustrative:

Aziz saw positive examples all around him. He was encouraged by the multiple initiatives springing up throughout the country including voluntary provision of emergency medical and legal support, turning houses into field hospitals and arranging food baskets for distribution. He saw in such acts ‘the spirit of the Syrian people’s resistance to the brutality of the system, the systematic killing and destruction of community’. (Leila al-Shami: The Life and Work of Omar Aziz)

Though we translated this sentence a little differently, we agree with Leila’s choice to use “community” here, whereas other translations have used “society”. It would be possible to translate this text in such a way that “society” was one of the most common words. However, we translated the Arabic word in question several different ways throughout the text to avoid what would be, to our ears, an excessive insistence on society. Because what is society? It is how the state sees the collected individuals, milieus, communities, families, political structures, classes, and so on that inhabit the territory it controls. An anarchic break with the state will also be a break with society, this non-free association of individuals held together by the shared experience of being ruled. As with “the people”, we believe avoiding the word “society” is consistent with Omar’s emphasis on “human beings” and decentralization, and so we’ve translated the Arabic word more often as “group”, “community”, or “collective”.

Omar insists repeatedly that what he is describing will vary based on local situations. He is not seeking to impose a model on all of “society”, but he does believe there is space for everyone to build a life for themselves and the people around them outside the control of the state on a non-hierarchical basis: groups of people adapting to local conditions with a shared commitment to collaboration and to not being ruled.

Omar Aziz’s work has had a huge impact on revolutionary organization in Syria. Whilst the mainstream political opposition failed to achieve anything of note in the past two years, the grassroots opposition movement, in the face of violent repression, has remained dynamic and innovative and has embodied the anarchist spirit. The core of the grassroots opposition is the youth, mainly from the poor and middle-classes, in which women and diverse religious and ethnic groups play active roles. Many of these activists remain non-affiliated to traditional political ideologies but are motivated by concerns for freedom, dignity and basic human rights. Their primary objective has remained the overthrow of the regime, rather than developing grand proposals for a future Syria. […]

There is no one model for the Local Councils, but they mainly follow some form of representative democratic model. Some have established different administrative departments to take over functions previously held by the state. Some have been more successful and inclusive than others which have struggled to displace the bureaucracy of the old regime or have been plagued by infighting. (Leila: Life and Work)

One of the biggest critiques to be made of The Formation of Local Councils and of the local councils themselves is that there is a current that seemingly favours bureaucratic, representative democracy. In a moment where many western anarchists are describing their projects as distinct from or hostile to democracy, it can be difficult to understand what moves anarchists elsewhere to push for local-level representative democracy as a form of governance. The local councils have not yet produced a cast of professional politicians, and in the ones we’ve heard most about in Aleppo and Daraya, the roles rotated often, had little or no coercive power, and the people holding them continued doing other kinds of work. But that doesn’t mean they would be able to avoid the pitfalls of representation in years to come.

Omar writes about the need to build administrative capacity to resume service provision, which can, among other more pressing concerns, include things like issuing birth certificates and recording marriages. We’ve read accounts of career bureaucrats joining the local councils in Daraya and busying themselves producing license plates with the revolutionary flag on them. The tension in the local council project that Leila describes above, and that Omar didn’t live to see arise, is the tension between social revolution and governing. Again, in practice, the local councils have been minimally bureaucratic, but not everyone involved sees them as a fundamental transformation of how people live, but rather as little democratic states-in-waiting. Obviously we still support these projects and think they’re beautiful and worthwhile, but we can’t ignore these kinds of tensions that arise in every mass movement when lots of people find themselves in the same spaces, opposing the same forces, but without necessarily sharing common goals.

And yet, there are fundamental differences between government and the local councils. The local councils as described in this text form by inviting people already doing important work, then slowly expanding to include more people in a wider geographic area as their capacity increases, while encouraging and making links with similar projects elsewhere. Their territories are defined by who participates, not by borders. And, unlike what some militias affiliated with the Rojava project have done, they spread by encouraging self-organizing elsewhere, not by conquering.

Omar helped found several local councils, including one in Daraya, which was one of the capitals of the revolution. Leila’s description of the revolution in Daraya can be found on her blog and is well worth reading, but here she describes its story as exemplary of the potential of local councils as well as the threats they face (written, of course, before the fall of Aleppo in late 2016, early 2017):

Omar Aziz didn’t live to see Daraya’s remarkable achievements. Nor was he able to witness other experiments in local self-organization, with varying degrees of success, across the country.
These local councils are not ideological but practical. Their first concern is to keep communities functioning in areas where the state has collapsed. They remain independent of political or religious directives, focusing instead on issues of immediate relevance such as service provision and food assistance. They work through the prism of their own culture and experience. As alternatives to state authoritarianism, their libertarian tendencies are undeniable.

By March 2016, it was estimated that there were 395 active councils in cities, towns and neighbourhoods, half of them concentrated in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. This estimate was made a few months following Russia’s military intervention to prop up the failing regime, which saw the loss of great swathes of liberated territory, placing these autonomous communities under threat. At the time of writing, other revolutionary suburbs around the capital are at risk of falling to the regime as a result of its “kneel or starve policy.” So too is Al-Waer, the last remaining revolutionary stronghold in Homs. And the 300,000 residents of liberated eastern Aleppo are under siege once more. (Leila: Legacy)

Omar wrote in the early days of the revolution, when areas completely free of Assadist control were only just emerging. As Editions Antisociales points out, “from the macabre perspective of the victim count of this massacre, which is almost the only “objective information” on Syria transmitted to a wider public, the first version [of the text] was written when there were ‘only’ about three thousand dead, and the second when the count suddenly swelled due to the shelling with heavy weapons of the first ‘liberated’ areas, such as the martyr neighbourhood of Bab Amr in Homs”. Omar only lived to see a taste of the overwhelming, one-sided violence that has all but swallowed up the Syrian revolution.

Perhaps the emphasis on democracy, administration, and society criticized above are pitfalls of organizing in a war zone against an authoritarian state that uses sectarianism as a key weapon. There was, and continues to be, an urgent need to create resilient social structures that can position themselves as an alternative to the Assadist state in meeting people’s needs. At the time, Omar didn’t see this as a burden, but rather as a revolutionary strategy. He, along with many other Syrian revolutionaries, had tremendous faith in the human potential that is unlocked when time and energy are freed from authoritarian structures. This is exemplified by the immense creativity and joy of the revolution’s early days, as it emerged from the smothering dictatorship. However, Omar writes that very quickly, time opened up by the revolution was filled up by a desperate struggle for survival — the regime’s ability to impose misery meant that this enormous human potential wasn’t able to manifest. In providing services and organizing people around them in non-hierarchical ways, the local councils hope to unlock this immense energy once again to defeat the regime and to rebuild new models of community (or even “society”). However, without outside support, the liberated areas have all too often been cut off and crushed through siege.

The main Assadist counter-insurgency strategy has been to transform a popular uprising into a civil war, forcing the opposition to militarize and favouring its most reactionary elements. Drawing on the analysis of Yassin al-Haj Saleh, we can talk about three tendencies within the Syrian conflict: revolution, civil war, and proxy war. All three tendencies have been present throughout and continue to be factors, but generally there was a chronological progression from revolution to civil war to proxy war, each of which also has forms of social organizing attached to them. The revolution is characterized by the local councils and their associated local self-defense groups that are more or less answerable to popular structures. As the conflict territorialized and large coalitions of rebel groups that were not accountable to grassroots formations emerged, the conflict increasingly became a civil war. The push towards civil war is strongly characterized by the power of counter-revolutionary islamist groups, especially ISIS and al-Nusra/Fatah al-Sham. Those groups then, in turn, became more and more dependent on their outside sponsors, and the political concerns of external states came to dominate; thus, the situation became the proxy war that currently confronts us.

However, just because the dynamics of civil war overtook the revolution, it doesn’t mean that revolutionary organizing stopped or that the revolution disappeared; in the same way, just because the proxy war dimension only came to dominate later on, it doesn’t mean that there wasn’t important meddling by other states in 2011.

A major threat facing these diverse initiatives has not only been the persecution of activists by the regime, lack of resources, the onslaught of the state’s attack of civilian areas and increasingly deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions. Some local councils have been hijacked by reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces. For example, in Al Raqqa non-local rebel groups with salafi/takfiri leanings took much of the power away from the local council. As they have tried to impose an Islamic vision which is alien to almost everyone, the people of Raqqa have been holding continuous protests against them. In [a video linked to on her blog] from June 2013 people are demonstrating against arrests of family members by Jabhat Al Nusra. The women are shouting “shame on you! You betrayed us in the name of Islam”. Throughout August 2013 the people of Al Raqqa have been protesting almost daily against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) demanding the release of hundreds of detainees, abductees and missing persons. (Leila: Life and Work)

Omar’s text only touches in an indirect way on the threat of reactionary counter-revolution, but the multi-polar nature of the revolutionary struggle became clearer around the time of his death. Though Omar was killed by the state, many of his comrades in developing the local councils were killed by reactionary conservative armed groups, notably the Douma 4 — Razan Zeitouneh, Wael Hamada, Samira Khalil, and Nazem Hammadi. They were kidnapped in a liberated area near Damascus by Jaish al-Islam, where they had tried to ensure that the local councils remained in control of the revolution and could act as a check on the armed groups. In the additions made in the second version of the text, we can see Omar’s increasing concern with this.

So we see, among other additions, a call to cooperate with the deserters who make up the Free Syrian Army, who had, in the meantime, rallied to the National Council which had “taken up the idea of local councils as its own”, as well as a dramatic call to establish more field hospitals. It was only five months later, in mid-July 2012, that the regime bombarded a rebel neighbourhood of Damascus for the first time. Abu Kamel’s (Omar Aziz’s pseudonym) project can only be understood in this frightening context […] (Editions Antisociales)

Omar’s position on the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and on the National Council is presented discretely but unambiguously in his text. He wants to collaborate with the FSA in order to ensure that the armed elements of the revolution answer to local, popular formations, rather than to defecting officers (and later, we could imagine, to foreign sponsors). The areas where this was most successful are also the areas that most successfully resisted the counter-revolutionary islamist forces — spectacularly, free Aleppo drove out first the Islamic State and, later, Jabhat al-Nusra. Similarly, Omar isn’t fully comfortable with the National Council, the official opposition in exile supported by western states; his vision is that power comes from the bottom up, so the only useful purpose of this higher structure is to co-ordinate fundraising, distribute resources to local councils (according to needs they define), and to promote and support the formation of councils. But if there was still hope in 2012 that the National Council would be at all worthwhile, that hope is now long gone.

The Formation of Local Councils should make it clear that the revolution cannot be resumed by the militarized formations, in spite of what every mainstream news source would say. Although not a pacifist movement as we would usually understand the term, much of the grassroots Syrian revolution does not believe that armed struggle is what will bring about a better life. Rather, it is the dual approach described in this text: destroying the state while producing new forms of life. Neither of those actions particularly require violence, but they must be determined and willing to defend themselves.

The revolution of “local co-ordinating committees” as it has been sketched out in Syria, doesn’t require any terror to reach its goals, it hates and abhors murder. It doesn’t seek vengeance, but rather justice. It is not a desperate attempt by a minority trying to squeeze all of reality into the mould of its ideals. It is the product of the actions of hundreds of thousands or millions of individuals who resolved to take their lives in their own hands and to go as far as possible towards their dream of freedom and dignity. And it is precisely this experience of universal importance that the Holy Alliance of its enemies tries at all costs to bury under ruins and lies. Bashar and Putin, the Iranian mollahs and the American congress, the pseudo-resistance of Hezbollah and the very christian Venezuelan police, the United Nations and al-Qaeda, the Communist Party of China and French know-how… The profiteers of the globalized system would rather transform Syria into a mass grave than willingly surrender their place at the table of those who divide up the world and ‘negotiate’ the future. (Editions Antisociales)

As this quote makes clear, none of the actors in the proxy war want to see a revolution based on local autonomy succeed in Syria, and ensuring continuing violence is the best way to suppress it. Revolutions are exceptional moments in time though, and even if they don’t last forever, they fundamentally transform the people who participate in them and open up possibilities for everyone around the world. Think of how much inspiration we still draw from struggles like the Paris Commune or the Spanish Revolution — the Syrian revolution is no less rich. As Omar said, “We are no less than Paris Commune workers: they resisted for 70 days and we are still going on for a year and a half.”

This brings up one last note on the translation. we have avoided referring to Omar, his comrades, or all the Syrian revolutionaries as “activists”, an identity that’s defined relative to a supposedly passive majority. As one friend pointed out, “You’d never refer to Durruti as an activist, or Louise Michel, so why would you talk about the coordinating committees that way?” It’s true, they have certain skills and experiences that are useful to the broader mobilization, but they are not distinct from it, nor are they leading it. Omar and those engaged in similar work created something vast and far-reaching, even if ultimately limited in time. Their commitment to radically doing away with the old world and dreaming a new one in its place is deeply inspiring, as Budour shows in this final quote:

Omar Aziz told his friends: ‘If the revolution fails, my life and that of my whole generation would be devoid of meaning… all that we have dreamt of and believed in would have been mere illusion.’ He passed away before seeing the triumph of the revolution and reaping the fruits of his majestic work. Syrians who are still alive owe Omar Aziz and the tens of thousands of Syrian martyrs a massive debt. It is a debt that cannot be paid with tears and moving tributes. Nothing less than fighting like hell for a free Syria would suffice. (Budour)

Cited texts

Omar Aziz: Rest in Power, by Budour Hassan, February 2013
budourhassan.wordpress.com

The life and work of anarchist Omar Aziz and his impact on self-organization in the Syrian revolution, by Leila al-Shami, published on Tahrir-ICN in August 2013
tahriricn.wordpress.com

The Legacy of Omar Aziz: Building autonomous, self-governing communes in Syria, by Leila al-Shami, published in November 2016 on Leila’s blog
leilashami.wordpress.com

Sous le feu des snipers, la révolution de la vie quotidienne (The Revolution of Everyday Life Under Sniper Fire), published by Éditions Antisociales in November 2013
www.editionsantisociales.com

Introduction from October 2011: Authority’s time and revolutionary time

A revolution is an exceptional event that alters the history of a society while also transforming each human being. It is a rupture in time and space, during which humans live two experiences of time simultaneously: authority’s time and revolutionary time. For a revolution to succeed, revolutionary time must become independent, so that people can collectively move into a new period. The Syrian Revolution has entered its eighth month and still has days of struggle ahead to topple the regime and open up new spaces for life.

Throughout the preceding phase, continuous demonstrations were able to break the absolute control of authority over space. Its control over the territory now varies, shifting from place to place, day to day, or even hour by hour. The continuous demonstrations also produced a National Council, which included participation from the popular movements, formal organizations, and political parties. It was tasked with being a legitimate alternative authority among Arab states and internationally that could incite the necessary action to protect the Syrian people from the brutality of this murderous regime.

However, the revolutionary movement has remained separate from day-to-day activities and so has been unable to enter into everyday life, which continues as it had in the past. It’s as though there exists a “daily division of work” between the tasks necessary to live in this world and revolutionary activities. This means that self-organizing in Syria is happening in two overlapping times: authority’s time, which continues to structure everyday activities, and revolutionary time, in which people take action to overthrow the regime. The danger doesn’t lie in the overlap of these two times, which is part of the nature of revolution, but rather in the separation between the progress of daily life and that of the revolution, for everyone involved. In the coming period, the movement will face two different threats : that human beings will get tired of the revolution and its impact on their material needs and family life, or that an increasing use of weapons will make the revolution a hostage of the gun.

Accordingly, the more self-organizing is able to spread as a force through the efforts of human beings to live in revolutionary time rather than in authority’s, the more the revolution will have laid the groundwork for victory. Let’s not forget that these past months were rich in all sorts of initiatives, especially ones focused on emergency medical care and legal support, and now we must urgently deepen these projects in order to take in broader spheres of life. Merging life and revolution is the key element for continuing the revolution and winning. This involves organizing for flexibility within social groupings by developing processes to co-ordinate revolution and everyday human life, which we will call here “local councils”.

Introduction from February 2012: Linking collective self-defense and continuing the revolution

The revolution has made it through its first year and still has many days of struggle ahead to bring down the regime and open up new spaces for life. During this past phase, continuous demonstrations succeeded in breaking the absolute control of power over space. Its control of the territory now varies, changing from place to place, day to day, and even hour by hour.

During this period, Syrians changed the course of their society while also transforming themselves. Drawing on an unprecedented courage and close cooperation, the sacrifices they have made show their desire for freedom and their commitment to collectively restructuring their lives.

Against the murder and atrocities of the regime and against its systematic destruction of community, the Syrian people’s spirit of resistance rises up with incredible skill and creativity, in an epic act of love that allows life to continue. Providing emergency medicine, turning houses into field hospitals, preparing food baskets, and finding creative ways to spread information : these are all actions that oppose tyrannical power and contribute to rich human relations based on cooperation and mutual aid.

Engaged people in Syria started forming coordinating committees in the early days of the revolution to organize media coverage, ensure the spread of information, and document both the accomplishments of the revolution, as well as the regime’s reprisals. These revolutionaries then broadened their activities to include relief work and medical care. It’s clear that these self-organized formations are collaborating and are contributing to a revolutionary strategy that would allow for resistance over the long term. This collaboration made new relationships possible that could break with the regime’s control over time and space, as part of the ceaseless effort to allow people to take autonomous control over their own lives, as they know this autonomy is what freedom is made of.

The past months have been rich with many projects to develop self-organizing, in a colourful diversity of initiatives and expressions that spans different regions and social groups. In the beginning, the revolutionary movement was separate from basic human activity and didn’t enter into daily life, as though there was a “daily division of labour” between the tasks necessary to live in this world and revolutionary activity. But popular solidarity developed, as people began choosing to share food and housing and to help one another in whatever way was needed. These practices spread throughout the areas where revolutionary activity was most intense, which made the link between revolution and life evident.

It’s clear then that the more self-organizing grows in power, the more able these deep social bonds will be to defend themselves and others against the repressive violence of the authorities, against moral slippage, and against the risk that the use of arms will slowly make the revolution and society as a whole hostages of the gun. Blending life and revolution is the necessary condition for the revolution to continue until the regime is destroyed. This in turn requires adaptable forms of social organization that enable a co-ordination between the revolution and daily human life. These efforts have been referred to in different ways, but here we will call these new social formations “local councils”.

The Formation of Local Councils: Main text from February 2012

This introduction and what follows are an invitation to form local councils composed of people from different cultures and from different segments of society that will work to achieve the following goals:

To support human beings in managing their lives autonomously, without state institutions or structures (even if this autonomy is not complete)
To create space for collective expression that can reinforce cooperation among individuals and that can encompass more necessary tasks as political engagement grows.
Incite social revolutionary activities on a regional level while unifying supporting structures

As well, the following issues are important and need to be addressed by the local councils:

1) Human interdependence and civil solidarity

Objectives

Relieve the physical and emotional suffering of families displaced by the barbarous violence of the authorities
Provide emotional and practical solidarity to families impacted by death, injuries, arrests, or disappearances or who have suffered other physical or psychological harm
Improve living conditions for families
Create the best possible conditions for medical practitioners
Ensure that educational services continue

Role of the local councils

At a minimum, local councils should :

Provide support and assistance to those arriving in a specific area or departing from it: the role of the local council here is to step in to alleviate the misery created by the authorities through actions arising solely from popular initiatives
Find safe housing and supplies for displaced individuals and their families in the area where the council operates and in co-ordination with its counterpart in the area they left
Organize the collection of information about arrestees and ensure its distribution to the appropriate groups involved in the revolution. Set up lines of communication with people with legal expertise and support families in following-up about the situation of arrestees
Keep track of the needs of affected families and work to meet those needs by creating solidarity funds and through regional revolutionary funds
Provide physical, emotional, and logistical support to affected families, make sure they have the supplies and funds they need. This war by the authorities against people has transformed the time they would have spent living into time spent looking for safer shelter for themselves and their families. It has transformed their daily work into an endless search for information about their loved ones who have dissapeared, to figure out where they are being held, with only the support of their families or the people they happen to know in the area where they took refuge. It is therefore necessary to:
- Support and collaborate with revolutionary individuals and groups with legal expertise to document abuses carried out by the army, by the intelligence agencies, and by the shabbiha [informal enforcers], such as murder, rape, arrest, property destruction, and theft.
- Provide a caring environment that allows for less psychological and material stress for displaced families, especially for women and children. Coordinate with skilled providers to ensure support for physical and psychological health, especially for those who need the most attention.
Civil administration: Because of the ferocious regime attacks, it falls to the local councils to create administrative records for those who struggle against the regime, especially those who have gone underground. And in those areas where the revolution has gained some independence, they could even begin registering births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and so on.
Co-ordinate with relief organizations to provide humanitarian and financial aid, in particular:
- Identify food and medical needs, as well as any other necessities of life
- Organize to receive and distribute aid
- Compile and spread statistical data
Co-ordinate with medical committees
- Identify homes suitable to be turned into field hospitals and organize their defense alongside their owners
- Prepare the field hospitals in coordination with the medical committees
- With medical and aid groups, identify the needed medical supplies and training, and work to receive and store those supplies
- Follow-up on responses to emergencies, especially those coming from outside the area
Support and help coordinate educational initiatives
- Identify the educational requirements at all levels
- Co-ordinate with educational institutions in the area and with anyone who is able and willing to teach
- Organize and administrate educational activities
Support and co-ordinate outreach initiatives

Note: Such work requires organization and knowledge of the arts of administration, but these above tasks are not impossible, whatever the environment may be. This revolution has produced many people skilled at the organization of demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins, and so it can also push to create experts in the fields in which people have already engaged spontaneously. But let’s also remember that projects like these are not meant to replace family and friendship bonds (at least not at first) and under no circumstances should there be any coercion to participate. Humans who have begun learning to live without services provided by the state and who have found temporary replacements for them through family relationships will need time and practice to integrate themselves into a broader social sphere that’s more effective and elaborate.

2) On relationships between individuals: Creating new common interests

Objectives

Increase the capacity for action and initiative by individuals in the social body
Create spaces for discussion of human concerns and of solutions to problems of daily life
Build horizontal relationships of interdependence between local councils in a given region and broaden these to include other geographic areas

Role of the local councils: What should be, at a minimum, the local council’s work

The revolution has transformed individual humans by opening up new horizons in their lives, particularly once they were sure that confrontation was the way to gain their freedom and that by continuing on this path they would find new possibilities for tomorrow. By developing new ways of defining themselves rich with innovative, inventive power, they were able to overcome the smothering individualism of a half-century of authoritarian rule. They discovered that mutual aid pushes open the doors to exciting and colourful social richness.

The challenge facing the local councils consists of making people comfortable with this social environment, by creating open space for free dialogue. This is necessary for achieving ongoing, friendly relations while also securing the future of the revolution as a collective project. Towards this end, the local councils will pursue these goals:

Form “social spaces” that allow people to discuss the difficulties in their daily lives, debate what is needed, and develop appropriate solutions. To keep the delicate balance between the continuation of the revolution and the protection of those around them, these solutions will have to consider the following points:
- Local concerns
- Infrastructural concerns
- Social harmony
- Regional fundraising
- Delve into all issues relating to people’s livelihoods and their expectations for life and work and find collective solutions wherever possible
Analyze questions that demand solutions beyond the local context, such as funding or support for other regions
Defend the land in the region from being expropriated by the state, because such expropriations of land in Syria’s cities and countryside and the consequent displacement of their inhabitants are one of the core pillars of the politic of domination and social exclusion on which the regime relies. This policy was adopted to create residential areas for government employees and soldiers and officers of the army, or in the name of business, to create shopping centres for the rich. In rural and suburban areas, the revolutionary movement formed partly as a rejection of this policy of expropriation and exclusion that cuts human beings off from their subsistence base. The work of the local committees is then’:
- Inventory the lands affected by expropriation
- In the event of expropriation of land for security purposes: support the local residents in defending the land and property in their region
- In the event of expropriations of land for residential purposes or other development projects: do what you can to preserve good relationships with the local residents and seek a solution that meets the needs of all parties

Note: Clearly, these kinds of actions are only possible in areas that are secure or nearly “liberated” from the authorities. But its possible to carry out plans specific to an area that take into account what’s possible there.

3) On the relationship with the Free Syrian Army: The need to protect communities while continuing the revolution

Objectives

Make the people around us safer and protect demonstration so that they can expand to new areas
Ensure lines of communication between regions by protecting the movement of people and providing logistical support

Role of the local councils: What should be, at a minimum, the local council’s work

Provide safe housing and supplies to members of the Free Syrian Army
Coordinate and build consensus with the Free Syrian Army on strategies for the defence of the region
Work with the Free Syrian Army to empower people in the area to take charge of security and administration

4) On the formation of local councils and their organizational structure

The process of forming local councils faces many obstacles, not the least of which are the deadly violence of the regime, how areas are cut off from each other, the frequent raids cities and villages. Each of these factors greatly limit the ability of people to move around and shut them into closed circles. Confronted with this, the revolution has demonstrated in every region that mechanisms to resist these killings give rise to adaptability and creativity. They also contribute to new practices aimed at overcoming the limits put on peoples collective dreams for freedom and that are able to react appropriately to the shifting balance of power on the ground. Therefore, the formation of local councils is influenced by the following factors:

The formation of local councils is a dynamic process that responds to the needs of the situation and how people engage with it
Every success achieved by one council will contribute to the efforts of the others and will increase the determination of all their members
The formation of local councils will vary based on the intensity of the movement in a given region, meaning it will be more difficult in those areas subjected to a heavy presence of security forces and easier in areas where the revolutionary movement has more capacity
This important process of creating local councils will not be easy, but it’s critical if the revolution is to continue. It’s hard not only because of the security deployment and the sieges targeting communities and areas, but also because it involves trying new and unconventional ways of living and relating to one another. This requires becoming independent while breaking with authority, so the role of the councils is to support and develop economic and social activities in their area, based on administrative experience in different domains.
In light of the difficulties involved in organizing elections under current circumstances, the local councils will consist of those whose social engagement has earned them wide respect, on the basis of their social and technical skills and their organizing experience. They should have the capacity and desire to work as volunteers, as well as the adaptability necessary to engage with the family structures or political groupings present in an area
The activities of the local councils develop in stages according to local priorities. From the beginning, the following people will be involved:
- Members of the local council
- Engaged people from the region
- Willing people participating outside the region with expertise in the questions at hand

Taken together, this all lets us imagine an organizational structure that could take on the tasks of the local council. Ideally, the council should organize on a practical basis, starting small and developing further according to the needs of the community. This organizing will also change in accordance with the transformations brought about by the revolution to the balance of power with the regime in specific areas and what this entails for relationships with neighbouring areas.

5) The role of the National Council

The Council plays a pivotal role in the following matters:

The legitimacy of the initiative: By adopting the idea of local councils, the National Council helps give them the legitimacy they need to develop and it contributes to their acceptance by other people engaged on the ground
Funding: The National Council has agreed to take on the administration of “the revolutionary funds”, a necessary role that allows for greater flexibility in launching local councils by covering initial costs as well as later expenses that could not be covered locally
The National Council can facilitate organizing between areas and increase the level of organization on the provincial level, while each region and locality continues to engage in projects in line with their idea of the movement. This independence has clearly given the movement its tremendous adaptability, even though it was often affected by the lack of supportive spaces to protect it. The role of the National Council here is important for finding common ground and strengthening collaboration between different areas

A Note on the Text

The above translation includes the introduction to the version of Omar’s text published in October 2011 and the full text of the version he released in February 2012. These works were not published online until after his death at the hands of the regime in February 2013. It is based on the Arabic text found here: https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=143690742461532

This translation drew on a rough English translation of the first version of Omar’s text by Yasmeen Mobayed found on muqawameh.wordpress.com and on the French translation published by Éditions Antisociales in 2013: http://editionsantisociales.com/AbouKamel.php

Your anarchist comrades in NES – Diaries of the new dawn of a new Syria: A collection of analyses

Posted on 15/02/2025 - 15/02/2025 by muntjac

Taken from this post by ‘Anarchists In NES’ https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/a-in-nes-diaries-of-the-new-dawn-of-a-new-syria

You can follow them here; https://mastodon.social/@a_in_nes@kolektiva.social

Also avalible as a zine, which can be found on our zines page, it’s also on our Ko-fi

Introduction

The dictatorship of the Assad regime collapsed after more than 50 years. Although its downfall appears to be an overnight event, it is a complex result of many contradictions, balance of forces, geopolitical shifts and Syrian people’s struggle for freedom.

There is much to be said about what happened before, during and after the collapse of the Assad regime. This is a vast field of research and many narratives that should be covered by larger amount of literature. In this brochure we will focus on analysing the events which transpired during and after the demise of the regime. You are reading a result of summarizing the updates and analysis produced by Anarchist comrades on the ground in Northeastern Syria. We have taken our place in defense of the revolution and manage to regularly share our perspectives on what we see happening.

As we are writing this, the February 8^th comes close and marks two months since the fall of dictatorship. We take this opportunity to summarize our work into a more coherent analytical overview.

The near future in front of us is uncertain. Many possibilities exist, covered with fog of uncertainty. Many people in Syria want peace, but the air if full with tension and anticipation of war. There are doubts whether another option exists, other than standing to defend the revolutionary gains against all odds and against all authoritarian powers around. Peaceful agreements and diplomatic solutions are hard to believe when it comes to states. Everyone pursues their interests. And peoples of Northeast Syria will pursue their interests, too — revolution must be defended. Otherwise — no justice, no peace, no free life. We will continue our struggle here, and we are ready to take our humble place in whatever is about to come.

Revolutionary greetings from your Anarchist comrades in NES, February 2025

01/12/24 What is going on on Syria?

This is a fast update on the situation on Syria to share with comrades, since things are really getting wild. We share mostly facts, political analysis not in this message.

These notes can be confusing for those not familiar with the situation here, feel free to ask!

Few days ago the ‘rebels’ of Idlib and surroundings, under military leadership of HTS (a new name of what once was al-Qaeda in Syria) started a big offensive, breaking the siege of the SAA (Syrian Arab Army). The offensive broke throw their lines and started to advance to Aleppo (second biggest city of Syria). They are advancing fast and in multiple directions.
- Today the offensive goes on, taking control of big part of Aleppo city, with exception of some pockets under regime control and the northern Kurdish neighborhood of Sheik Makhsud.
- SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) made a big deployment in reaction to the threats, taking control of the road connecting Aleppo to Raqqa, also connecting with the region of Tal Rifat, where refugee camps for Afrin IDP where at risk of invasion by SNA.
- SNA (Syrian National Army, proxy of Turkey in Syria) also started an offensive, probably in coordination with HTS, and there are now clashes between SDF and SNA in the Raqqa-Aleppo road. For now those clashes are small, not comparable with the massive offensive of HTS against SAA.
- HTS is already attacking Sheik Mahksud in Aleppo, after most of the city fell under their control with SAA being overrun and withdrawing in mass. Kurdish forces are fighting back, ready to defend their ground.
- As for now, the ‘rebels’ also reached the city center of Hama and some northern areas of Homs. Seems there are also clashes in Damascus. There are rumors of a coup taking place, seem that some national television went off air after some (still confusing) clashes.
- Other ‘rebel’ forces that were trained by US in al-Tanf (South Syria) are also moving, not clear where or why.
- Iranian forces (very present together with SAA) are being captured or expelled. Iran says this is a coup of Israel-Turkey-US. Diplomatic envoy of Iran will go to Turkey on Monday to discuss situation
- Since the beginning of the offensive Russia has been moving troops, leaving their ground positions in Tal Rifat (Kurdish areas)
As for now, seems clear that the SAA collapsed, ‘rebels’ are taking positions in several big cities and rumors that entire brigades are deserting defecting to the “rebels”. The situation is confusing and shifting.
- Iraq decided to close down borders with Syria, a lot of diplomatic talks and speculative journalism ongoing. Besides Iran there is a surprising radio silence. – Turkey is not saying much for now, neither Russia who just fired their general command of Syria.
NES (North East Syria, aka Rojava) is in the middle of all this, trying to defend the advances of the revolution and specially the Kurdish people of Afrin and Sheik Mehksud. SDF reacted very fast to the threats, seizing the road and avoiding the surrounding of Kurdish areas on this offensive. Is not clear how much HTS and SNA working together or they just started coordinated offensive, also not clear the role of ‘southern rebels’ trained by US. SDF have a defensive position, but taking control of some territories as SAA withdraw.

It’s messy, it’s confusing, it’s not clear what is going on. We will see how things develop. There are more things we could say but this message is already to long so I’ll stop here.

Revolutionary greetings!

02/12/24 What does it mean? Some bullet-points analyizing the situation

In the first days of HTS offensive and SNA push against Şehba, as well as siege of Sheikh Maqsood, it is clear that Assad regime is in very difficult situation and it’s collapse seems possible. However, potential HTS rule will not be stable and will not resolve crucial issues of Syria that were created and fueled by the dictatorship of Bashar Al-Assad. Nevertheless, the fall of Assad might open a glimpse of chance for changes in the region, if Syrians – those in the country and those who will decide to come back after exile – will manage to claim original ideas of Syrian revolution.
Major geopolitical forces such as Turkey, U.S. and Israel will benefit from offensive of HTS. HTS fits everyone as a force that is opposed to Iran, Assad and Russia. Given a chance to take up state-making in case of success and follow Taliban model, it is possible that main actors will exercise their influence in a possible future new government. It is possible that these states might give support to HTS, but are not interested in Syrian peoples independently deciding for themselves.
Fall of Assad regime will be good for DAANES in various aspects, but poses major questions: A) Threat of ISIS taking up the opportunity and growing again while not having to fight Russia and Assad, although they will fight with HTS, B) Growing interference by U.S. in case of increased dependence on their protection against potential Turkish invasion, C) Finding new balance of forces in the region, D)Turkey expanding its direct control far deeper into Syria, and E) Religious fundamentalists of HTS taking over will bring sharp conflict with development and revolutionary achievements of society in NE Syria, first and foremost of women.
Situation for Lebanon will be very difficult, as the country will be sandwiched between Israel and HTS-run part of Syria, and might create ground for escalation of internal conflicts. Hezbollah will be left without support from Iran.
DAANES is offering a non-state solution based on self-governance, cultural, religious, gender and ethnical autonomy. Still, it gets the least recognition and international support.

Revolutionary greetings!

06/12/24 The regime is collapsing

It is clear that no one have any faith in Assad government anymore. We feel confident to announce that this is the end of the regime. For many Syrians today will be a day of celebration. After almost 13 years of war, misery and exile, their dreams of a Syria without Bashar are coming true. In that sense, it is a day of celebration for us too.

But the end of the regime will probably be just the beginning of a new phase of conflict and instability, a very difficult one. Syria have become a ground for many military forces (state forces and non-state forces) to use violence and war to pursue their objectives without fear for the consequences. From the brutality of the Syrian regime and Russian mass bombings of civilian population, the inhumane and horrific massacres of the Islamic State or the genocidal and imperialist occupations of the Turkish Army and it’s proxies against the Kurdish people and the Rojava Revolution.

More than a decade of war and suffering left wounds that won’t heal with the end of the Assad dynasty, and the following day will probably witness more bloodshed and atrocities. The declarations of SNA operation against Manbij will probably be the beginning of a brutal war of occupation as we already saw in 2018 in Afrin and 2019 in Serekaniye and Gire Spi. The future of Damascus still unclear, and the authoritarian Islamism of HTS will soon start to show it’s dark faces to the Syrian people, the faces that are not screened in CNN but that the people of Idlib, who had been protesting against their authoritarian rule for months, has been suffering and protesting against.

Western powers will tacitly accept (and maybe even support) this mediatic and apparently diluted version of salafism, as they already did in Afghanistan. And those big moves will partly silence the massacres of Turkey in Manbij, letting the rouge NATO partner of middle east a bit lose in exchange for their loyalty in other affairs that are of higher priority for western agenda.

Anyway, this is already too long. If you made it here probably you have opinion on your own about the situation. And maybe now is not a time for words, but a time for action. The revolution in Rojava is, as always, under threat. Let’s celebrate the fall of the regime, but let’s keep building the new world we carry in our hearts.

Revolutionary greetings!

09/12/24 Attacks on Manbij, but SDF is not SAA.

There are too many things ongoing in Syria, the developments are extraordinarily fast – and probably confusing for those not familiar with the situation. Every part of the conflict is racing to position themselves and get advantage from the political transition that will follow in Syria.

Regarding the situation in NES, the resistance in Manbij is critical. A collapse of the SDF in Manbij would had been followed by further attack of SNA, but the military proficiency displayed has been the best deterrence for further movements of SNA. It showed that SDF is not the SAA, and that blietzkrieg tactics of rushing with armored vehicles under artillery fire cover can send regime soldiers running away, but SDF is ready to hold positions and fight back.

For Turkey, Manbij is also very important, and it will be a decisive battle for the future of the SDF and the DAANES. This battle is proving that a well trained and prepared force, even if lightly equipped, can inflict massive losses to a much more numerous and well equipped force, even when they have total air supremacy. Every day that SDF holds any ground in Manbij is one more day that Turkey is being defeated, making SNA looking weaker. HTS took several big cities in days, SNA can’t take one middle sized city even when having full support of Turkish airforce. But of course, as we said at the beginning, SDF is not SAA.

The attacks of Israel can also open new cans of worms, igniting old hates and legitimizing more extreme and fundamentalist positions inside HTS, overwhelming the moderate face that they had been working to present.

Many more things could be say, but this is already getting long so we stop here for today.

Revolutionary greetings!

10/12/24 Turkey on the north, Israel on the south

The withdraw of SDF from Manbij is a painful concession. Many comrades lost their lives in the liberation of Manbij from the hands of ISIS, including the brave arab commander of YPG Abu Leila, also 8 internationalist fighters. As Erdogan stated many times, their next target is now Kobane, the proud city that became the turning point on the war against ISIS through and historic resistance. Kobane was also a key element for the internationalization of the Rojava revolution and the Kurdish question, becoming a symbol of resistance known to the whole world.

The dimension of Israel attack all over Syria is not just a deterrence action against the possibility of a hostile Syria, it is also a show of force a military capabilities to neighboring countries. It is also the perfect scenario for IDF to test their response capacity and air force at such a big scale, without fear of any repercussions since there is no one in Syria able to answer to such brutal attacks.

Turkey’s propaganda campaigns, with miss information and fabricated videos, aims to weaken SDF and destabilize the DAANES. Now they also try to spark intra-Kurdish conflict, harvesting the investments they made for decades in the Barzani-led KRG, using all tools at their hands in this war. Even HTS is calling attention to that, publishing a press statement denouncing SNA’s fabrication of fake videos. But exposing their dirty methods is not enough to stop them, we need to take action in all fronts possible to put an end to their atrocities.

Syria is moving from the joy and celebrations after the fall of the regime, to the darkest hours it lived since the worst times of the war. Israel and Turkey are committing massacres and abusing their power to impose their agendas, taking advantage of the situation to feed their greed and expansionist ambitions. The revolution is under existential threat, and it is our duty, as internationalists and as revolutionaries, to make sure they can’t break this revolution. The world is descending into really dark paths, with war and oppression gaining ground all around. But there is also hope and revolutionary opportunities in those situations. It is partly in our hands to decide where we go from this point.

Revolutionary greetings!

11/12/24 The rush for influence on a new Syria

HTS is now busy making itself more presentable to western audiences, hoping to gain official legitimacy throw capturing the Syrian state structure. Western powers are going along with that, and no one is putting much attention to the small scale attacks that their rogue islamist groups are doing. The DAANES is holding talks with them, accepting them as provisional government for now, hoping to halt Turkish offensive and work towards a federal Syria that respects regional autonomy.

Turkey is moving further in their attacks, striking as far as Raqqa, making a bold statement that they are ready to defy US red lines in order to achieve their aims. The SNA soldiers are recording and spreading videos of the horrendous crimes they are committing as part of their psychological warfare, evoking the behavior of ISIS. This is not a coincidence, several ISIS fighters have been reported to be now holding command positions inside different factions of SNA.

Israel is moving further into Syria, defying even the UN that called to not push forward. With Russia and Iran losing all their influence on Syria, Israel and Turkey (strategic NATO allies, Turkey being formal member of the military alliance) are taking advantage of the situation to advance their imperialist agendas, indirectly supporting each other in their occupations.

DAANES is struggling to sustain the developments of past years, with Turkey attacks on Euphrates region and inter-tribal tensions in Deir-Ezzor, where some tribes pleading alliances with HTS while others reaffirm their support to SDF. This is nothing new, is the continuation of the tribal conflicts that had been ongoing in the region for some time.

One important topic to put attention is the situation of women. Women played very important roles all along Syria since the first uprisings of 2011, but in HTS protests and events, the absence of women is very noticeable, specially when compared with the role of women in DAANES. Rojava is a women revolution, and this is becoming even more obvious now, when all other forces are overwhelmingly male.

Enough for today, keep struggling and support the revolution!

Revolutionary greetings!

12/12/24 Disinformation and ethnic conflicts

The situation is getting very confusing on the ground, with disinformation spreading on social networks and political talks behind closed doors. Verifying information is becoming a critical step to understand what is happening, since Turkish propaganda strategy relays on a very strong disinformation apparatus.

This specially affect a lot of Syrian returnees, since many of them had been living in Turkey and being exposed to the Turkish narrative of criminalization of SDF. This will feed ethnical tensions between Kurds an Arabs, risking more conflicts and even violence.

This comes together with the inter-Kurdish conflicts we discussed two days ago, and indicates a general plan of turkish state intelligence to divide and isolate the leading forces of the revolution. Other forces like US or HTS will not oppose to such a plan, since a weakened revolutionary force will make it easier to dilute and manipulate the political project of the DAANES. This puts the achievements of the revolution in serious danger, and is more important than ever to expose and denounce such strategies, building a common revolutionary front to face enemy attacks.

Revolutionary greetings!

14/12/24 Context on the ceasefire disagreements about a tomb

Short explanation Written by YPG/YPJ International:

The tomb of Suleyman Shah

Part of the negotiated ceasefire between #SDF and #Turkey was connected to the location of the tomb of Suleyman Shah and its military implications. Let’s dive into this a little deeper to understand what this is all about:

Suleyman Shah lived in 13^th century and, according to Ottoman legacy, is the grandfather of Osman I, who founded the Ottoman Empire. Because todays #Turkey likes to see itself as successor of the Ottoman Empire, the tomb and remains are important for them.

The tomb of Suleyman Shah was Turkey’s only foreign enclave, located more or less 30km from the Turkish border close to Qere Qozaq, on the river banks of Euphrates. In 2014 the tomb and its 38 Turkish guards, were completely surrounded by #ISIS.

So the tomb was brought to Ashme village, between #Kobane and Euphrates river, a site closer to the Turkish border, where it was easier and less risky to protect, but still on Syrian (and #SDF) territory. Turkey stressed that the relocation would only be temporarily.

While now negotiating the ceasefire, it was offered to help transfer the tomb again, but #Turkey instead requested that it will be given 1km of land in this area, where they intend to deploy heavy weapons and build a military base. Thus no agreement could be reached.

Revolutionary greetings!

16/12/24 10 points of NES diplomacy

The Autonomous Administration of NES has proposed 10 points to start a political dialogue with the provisional government:

10 point proposal of NES

“Cooperation between the governments of NES and Damascus would be to the advantage of everyone in Syria and could help overcome the current difficulties.”

First of all, it is important to maintain the unity and sovereignty of the Syrian state and to protect the country from attacks by the Turkish state and its supporters.
Military operations on the entire Syrian territory should be ended to start a comprehensive and constructive national dialogue.
We appeal to all sides, to refrain from rhetoric of hatred and betrayal to pave the way for a constructive dialogue. Syria is a country that is rich in many ways. This wealth must be preserved, based on justice and democracy.
We suggest an early meeting of the Syrian political actor: inside in Damascus to standardize the visions for the transition phase.
We would like to work for women to participate even more in the political process than before.
We emphasize that resources and economic wealth should be distributed fairly between all Syrian regions, since they belong to all citizens of the Syria.
We would like to work to ensure that the original and violently displaced population can return to their areas. It is important to us to preserve their cultural heritage and to end the policies of demographic change.
In view of the developments in Syria, we reaffirm our commitment in the fight against terrorism to prevent the return of IS terrorists, through the joint cooperation between SDF and the international anti-IS coalition.
We are of the firm believe that the occupation must be ended. The Syrian people must be given the opportunity to determine their future and use the principle of the good neighborhood.
We welcome the constructive role of the Arab states, the United Nations, the International Anti-IS coalition and all active international actors and ask everyone to take on a positive and effective role in the advice and support of the Syrian people. And to facilitate the communication between the different population groups in order to ensure stability and security and stop foreign interventions.”

16/12/24 HTS and international fascism

We can see how EU and US are not concerned with the past of HTS as a branch of Al- Qaeda, accepting their provisional government very fast. At the same time very little support or recognition has been given to NES, even when has been the main force on the ground fighting ISIS. Clearly the deciding factors for western powers are not human rights, ethical values and democracy as they like to claim, their decisions are being guided by anti-refugee sentiments and economical interests on oil and gas.

As right-wing parties take more power in governments, their electoral promises of harder migration laws guide their political programs. Those governments end up supporting authoritarian regimes that promise order and stability, hoping they will keep refugees away from their borders, when its exactly those regimes that force people to flee. There is a long history of western powers, especially US, supporting religious fundamentalist groups over socialist revolutionary forces. This goes against ethnic and religious minorities and especially against women and queers, since religious fundamentalism and patriarchy always go hand in hand.

A German organisation called GfbV (society for threatened peoples) warned: “The new rulers of Syria are presenting themselves in the media as moderate, but there are already many signs that they are not keeping their promises. (…) Turkish ruler Erdoğan has already sent his foreign minister to Damascus to torpedo a peaceful solution between HTS and DANNES. Erdoğan’s policy is extremely dangerous. The German government, especially the Federal Foreign Office, must not rely on Erdoğan and the Syrian Islamists if it really wants to create stability and a long-term peace order”

We see that the liberal left seems more aware of the situation, but they are not gonna risk anything to stop it. As it already happened with ISIS, there are threats that won’t be stopped with political diplomacy and economic sanctions. Fascism can have many colors, and it is always in deeply militarized and patriarchal environments where it thrives the best. Religious fundamentalism is therefore a perfect ground for fascism in the Middle East, as islamophobia and racist nationalism is in western territories.

Fascism needs to be stopped before it’s to late. Even if having different colors, authoritarian forces will eventually cooperate to eradicate autonomy and diversity. The mentality of dominant male, imposing their hegemony and dreaming of bigger and bigger nation-states under their rule, is the main threat for any expression of free life. But denouncing it is not enough, we have to take action to make sure their ambitions are prevented. And if not you, who? If not now, when?

One solution. Revolution. Revolutionary greetings!

18/12/24 Rojhilat Efrin on attacks against women

The General Commander of YPJ Rojhilat Efrîn highlighted the ongoing resistance against foreign occupation and stressed the significance of safeguarding the region’s autonomy and women’s rights. She noted that the Middle East is being redesigned, with paramilitary groups and factions contributing to insecurity. The attacks against women symbolize the broader destabilization of society. The importance of international backing for the region’s self-management system is seen as vital for the Kurdish, Arab, and broader regional populations.

Revolutionary greetings!

20/12/24 The dark sides of a new government

The assassination of two Kurdish journalists is a painful reminder of how news and information is a weapon of war.

We are seeing elaborate schemes in social networks, where fake information and fabricated war headlines are propagated, distorting reality and creating confusion about the situation on the ground. This is part of psychological warfare, another form of waging war employed by our enemies. This broadcast channel is partly an answer to it. We know that war has many sides, and that we need to give collective answers to all of them, building mechanisms of self-defense against all kinds of attacks. We also see attacks against health workers, with an ambulance that was transporting injured recently being targeted in the Kobane region. These kinds of attacks are not just attacks against civilians, are attacks against basic ethical standards.

Western powers like to claim a moral high ground, talking about democracy and human rights. Turkey is a NATO member that has been spitting on any basic ethical standards, and still got a new bribe of 1 billion E in the form of aid to control refugees. HTS was on the terrorist lists for its links with Al-Qaeda. But now, climbing the ladder to the top of a Nation-State, that is not relevant for the other heads of State anymore. As it already happened with the Taliban.

It deeply reflects how States are born, with brutal and murderous gangs fighting and killing, until one big man manages to establish himself as president, as king, or even as god. And then the other big men around him applause and congratulate his ascend. After that, maybe they put some make-up and rewrite the history here and there, to make sure it suits whatever is the current trend in present literature. And, voila! A new government is born.

It is also pathetic to see Turkey and Israel building tensions, accusing each other of the same crimes they are committing themselves. Especially when their military intelligence agencies collaborate and negotiate the occupation and partition of Syria behind the cameras.

“The Truth will not remain captive in the darkness”

Nazim Dashtan

Comrade Nazim, comrade Cihan, all the brave fighters defending this revolution: Rest in Power!

Revolutionary greetings!

22/12/24 Diplomacy and the 4D chess

Very fast, al-Julani traded his military-style green shirt for a business-style black suit and a tie, hosting several official meetings this Sunday in the Syrian presidential palace. A new technocrat is born, paving his way to the presidency of Syria and to the corridors of the international Realpolitik.

This creates a very challenging situation for the DAANES, since it is the game that Kurdish politicians had been trying to play for the last years. Diplomatic institutions had become an important work for the bodies of the self-administration, moderating the revolutionary narrative to look formal and acceptable to western audiences, aiming to achieve recognition and status for North-East Syria. It worked for a while, creating an illusion that office politics and diplomacy was the right path to follow. But now this illusion is vanishing.

The negotiations of Mazlum Abdi for a ceasefire in Kobane, proposing a demilitarized zone, rightly addressed the concerns that Turkey was putting on the table about the tomb of Suleiman Shah. This exposed the hypocrisy of AKP, that was just using those conditions as an excuse for their attacks. But with US entering the game, and especially with the fierce resistance of SDF in Tishreen and Qereqozah, the invasion got halted for now. SDF is crushing wave after wave of the mercenaries that Erdogan is sending.

Erdogan has hopes that Trump will side with him when he takes office, but the pro- Kurdish positions from some senators of the republican party -with a the bipartisan bill against Erdogan proposed in the US senate- are now bringing doubts about that. Kurdish diplomacy has been playing a pivotal role in the last years, and the revolutionary process also paid a price for it, having to play the role that western powers (mainly US) wanted to see “the Kurdish partners” playing.

But the Kurdish liberation movement is more than the diplomacy of Rojava, and the resistance in Kobane is proof of that. We made it that far because the people of Rojava have always been ready to fight and defend their land. If we want to push for revolutionary transformations, we need to take initiative and go on the offensive.

Revolutionary greetings!

23/12/24 Pushing back in Manbij countryside

The SDF seized the opportunity and are making an advance towards Manbij. Since SDF kicked out ISIS in 2016, Manbij had years of democracy and stability. Now we see how the local population refuse to accept the Turkish occupation and the violent fundamentalists groups of SNA. We can see how the self administrations managed to get the vast majority of the people behind the idea of this revolution.

This is a very important victory, not just for the military aspect but also on the political side. Pushing back against the occupation is also a psychological blow for the Turkish proxy groups, that find themselves in disarray in front of the advance of SDF. Phones and other devices captured in the advance of SDF are now showing their communications, where desperate calls for help and scared communications of fighters running away are being circulated in whatsapp groups. Their dependency on Turkish military power makes them vulnerable to SDF counter attacks, because they don’t have contingency plans for those situations.

Still, Turkish air superiority is a massive challenge for SDF advance. Advances towards Manbij are a big achievement, and we should celebrate it. But the war is not over, Turkish planes can become a nightmare not just for SDF but for all peoples of northern Syria. It is still not clear how much Erdogan will try to play political in his alliance with HTS, or how much he will go full on with military attacks.

But this will be something we will need to evaluate in the future, today let’s ceebrate this amazing victory of SDF!

Revolutionary greetings!

24/12/24 The dark side of a new government II

HTS is consolidating their power, announcing the disarmament of different factions and their integration into a new national army, under control of the provisional ministry of defense. The provisional government is also making concessions with Christian communities, that organized big protests in Damascus after the arson attack on a Christmas tree in Hama. It looks a bit weird for us to see their demonstrations, marching and holding crosses above their heads, playing with the hegemony of Christianity of western powers as a tool of deterrence.

Anyway, it worked. Ahmed al-Sharaa announced that those who burned the tree were not Syrians, and that there is no place in the new Syria for them. He learned fast to speak the language on western nation-states, using racism and xenophobia to blame the other, to pin any crimes and problems on some external threat, closing ranks under one flag, one nation, one state. But it really seems that those who burned the tree where not Syrians, but Chechens, Islamist veterans that were counted among the elite fighters of the now dispersed al-Nusra front. As Mussolini did one century ago, when he dumped his loyal ‘fascio di combatimento’ paramilitaries once he got to the Italian parliament, al-Sharaa is now purging the ranks of HTS to consolidate his power.

But let’s not get lost in history. The important news for us are happening here, next to the Eufrates river. The counter-offensive on Manbij yesterday night had been an important victory, redefining the dynamics of the SNA-SDF ongoing conflict. It proved that SNA stands no chance against SDF without Turkish drones in the sky. It also means that, from now on, every time it rains, SNA mercenaries will be exposed to new SDF counter- offensives.

For those who had been in Rojava for some time, we remember how the Turkish offensives of 2018 and 2019 advanced ruthlessly to fulfil their aims (first Afrin, later Serekaniye and Gire Spi). Back then, they had green light of Russia and US to do as they wanted. Now, with Russia absent and US waiting for Trump to return to the white house, there is a window of opportunity where SDF can use the rainy days to push back. The first counter- offensive in Manbij has been a success, not just on a military level but also on a psychological level, showing that the revolutionary forces are ready to defend their land. This has sent a clear message: Kobane is a red line. If anyone mess with it, the spirit of the resistance that broke the advance of ISIS will once again burst free!

Revolutionary greetings!

25/12/24 Alawite tensions and SNA defections

There are now big protests in the main cities of Tartus and Latakia, reacting to the desecration of the tomb of an important Alawite scholar. This adds to videos that had been circulating on social networks, where HTS fighters are threatening and insulting Alawites in rural areas. Also in Hama and Homs big protests are ongoing, with rumors spreading of HTS opening fire against protesters. This can become a big challenge for the provisional government, since the stronghold of the old regime minority (the Alawites) can easily spark clashes and old hates, with HTS acting on old grudges and spite against them. Seems that SNA is now being deployed on Latakia too, and they will just add gasoline to the fire. This adds difficulties to HTS, that more or less managed to calm down the protests of Christians in Damascus for now, knowing that those are closely watched by western christian powers, even more on Christmas days.

Today there was also big confusion with a statement attributed to SDF, that was announced by Kurdish media but not visible on any SDF channels. The alleged statement called for armed groups in Serekaniye and Gire Spi to surrender their weapons, to abandon their positions and leave occupied territories, offering safe passage to other areas if they withdraw before the end of the year. Most Kurdish media removed the statement, but still the news circulated. On the ground no one knows anything about such plans. Still, after the success of the Manbij counter-attack, liberating Serekaniye is something that everyone is talking about.

Revolutionary greetings!

28/12/24 On minorities unrest and the need of a ‘democratic nation’ project

After a month since the offensive of HTS started, we have now better ground to evaluate what is going on in Syria. The unexpected collapse of al-Assad regime was followed by celebrations and hopeful dreams of an easy and bloodless transition in Syria. But this is something we only see in movies and history books. In real life most revolutions are followed by periods of instability and warlordism, where different factions struggle to impose their hegemony.

The recent protests of Christians, as well as the uprisings of Alawites, are complex events that are getting polarized in social networks. These two social groups had certain privileges during the regime of al-Assad, privileges that were partly established with the old French colonial rule, favoring them over Sunni Arabs or Kurds. But those privileges are also limited to some higher classes, and not all members of those groups were aligned with the regime.

Those uprisings are not simply “uncontrolled regime/Iran/Israel elements/agents” as HTS like to claim, it is also a reaction to the attacks of “uncontrolled HTS elements”, like the fire on the Christmas tree in Hama and the desecration of the grave of an important Alawite scholar. Those attacks are manifestations of ethnic grudges that many Sunni Arabs may share, but when ethnic simplifications like this are used to call for ethnic cleansing, things can very easily spiral out of control.

Many Alawites and Christians had power positions in the regime, but many Sunni Arabs too. Kurds know very well what it means to be part of a secondary class, to be at the bottom of the social pyramid. That’s why it has been so important for the DAANES to develop respectful and inclusive methods for everyone, allowing autonomy and self- organization to all different social groups. HTS sectarian visions, with Islamic fundamentalism as a ground to build a fake national unity, pose serious threats to the diversity of Syria.

The DAANES is already making calls to stop the attacks against Alawite people, to put an end to the sectarian violence, to build the nation under a base of diversity and respect for the other. The call for a “democratic nation project” should be understood in that sense, as part of a wider project for democratic confederalism, questioning old patterns of tribalism, patriarchy and nation-state. It is a call to continue the revolution all around Syria and beyond.

Revolutionary greetings!

29/12/24 Diplomacy and the 4D chess II

Any hopes of a tolerant and progressive government under HTS are rapidly dying. The military repression against Alawites has been just a glimpse of what is coming. After yesterdays call of the UN envoy for elections in 3 months, al-Sharaa responded today that no elections will take place in Syria in the next 4 years. He also announced his plans for the dissolution of HTS during the National Dialog Conference. That probably means to dissolve it inside the structures of a new centralized government, attempting to wash off the terrorist label that still hangs on HTS, while institutionalizing and taking control of a new Syrian state. In short, achieving a transition from Party to State, as any authoritarian force attempts to do.

We also include some words from Hawzhin Azeez, a Kurdish political academic who shared her reflections about the rumors of dissolution of SDF and the importance of YPJ:

It’s a mistake to see the YPJ as solely a response to end ISIS terrorism or an integral aspect of Kurdish national liberation. The YPJ are a permanent military force that will only dissolve itself when capitalist, statist and patriarchal oppression ends. They are ideologically committed to protecting women and themselves so long as these hierarchies of oppression and violence against women exist. They are a permanent women’s self protection unit here to stay. Even if the HTS/Jolani government manoeuvres the disarming of the SDF somehow, the YPJ is ideologically committed to permanent self protection even against the men/forces in their own communities. They cannot be dissolved! The YPJ is one of the most radical and groundbreaking aspects of Rojava’s Revolution.

Revolutionary greetings!

30/12/24 War is politics with effusion of blood

Today a pentagon official declared that the ceasefire between SDF and Turkey is holding. It’s surreal to read those declarations when heavy clashes are happening everyday around Manbij. Ahmed Al-Sharaa keeps receiving visits of foreign diplomats to gain legitimacy as negotiations are still ongoing. Mazlum Abdi affirms the will of SDF to become part of the new Syrian army if an acceptable agreement can be reached. And ISIS continues attacking security checkpoints in several areas of Syria.

The attacks yesterday of the Military Council of Serekaniye in the Turkish occupied areas were a good reminder of two things: 1) Many parts of Syria are still under occupation, and people are ready to fight to liberate their homes 2) SDF is probably the strongest military force on the ground. It is important to remember those things when we look at the negotiations between SDF and HTS. Any call for a new Syrian army needs to include SDF, and SDF will not accept to simply “give up the weapons”. SDF is currently protecting about a third of the Syrian territory, with a well grounded and coordinated force. Together with many local military councils, SDF also counts with special elite units, veterans of the war against ISIS. HTS surprised the world with their production and proficiency with kamikaze drones, and counts in their ranks with some veteran Islamist fighters. Still, HTS can’t defeat SDF on the ground, at least not without the Turkish support that is allowing the SNA to attack the SDF.

Another thing to keep in mind is that, after many years of silence, Syrians are now free to discuss politics openly in the street. Years of fear and repression from the regime secret services are now behind. Damascus, Aleppo, Homs… those are historical cities with vibrant new dynamics, that also carry important lessons from the years of resistance against the regime. Many politically organized Syrians are now in exile, but still many voices are already challenging the authoritarian moves of al-Sharaa. We also saw how Damascus was not liberated by HTS, in fact they arrived to the capital when Assad was already gone. The first military barracks stormed in the capital where the southern ones, with Druze flags and FSA brigades emblems. Those were welcomed by the people of the capital, that celebrated their arrival because they also wanted the regime out. So when tomorrow HTS starts to claim that they are the ones that saved Syria, remember that they are lying. It was the people who toppled down the regime.

Revolutionary greetings!

02/01/25 Politics is war without effusion of blood

We start 2025 with many things going on. January will be a challenging month, with a race of different actors to strengthen their positions, both in the military field as well as in diplomatic influence. Al-Sharaa is putting his HTS trusted circles in key positions in the government. You can read some of their (newly collected) biographies on Wikipedia, partly documenting their past activities as “brave jihadist fighters” of al-Nusra. How much they are just playing a theater for western audiences, or how much they really moderated themselves in exchange for power in a Nation-State, is something that will be more clear in the next months.

The statements of an insurgent “popular resistance movement”, with a certain Iranian flavor and with Russian fringe media echoing it, can contribute to new waves of instability if they come backed up with actions. The Druze community in the south also seems unwilling to cooperate with HTS transitional government, contributing to a mosaic of actors that question HTS’ proclaimed power. Meanwhile, many people in Syria’s western cities are going out to the streets, fixing roads and painting murals, reinforcing bonds of solidarity and mutual aid among neighbors. This networks of civic organizing can easily flourish in local committees and popular councils, as they already did in the early years of the Syrian revolution. How much HTS government will give space to these local initiatives, and how much these grassroots movements will confront the authoritarian steps of HTS, is something that will be a determinant for the future of Syria.

The press statement of the ‘joint forces’ leaving the SNA coalition is an important step, moving towards a generalized meltdown of the Turkish proxy forces. It is not clear how much it is an open defection or maybe a ‘cover’ operation of Turkish intelligence, aiming to ‘infiltrate’ some of their trusted agents in the new Syrian Army. Still, together with many local reports of groups and fighters defecting to go back home, plus the big amount of losses that the resistance of SDF is inflicting against their attacks, all this is making SNA more an more unable to hold their ground. How much Turkey will try to keep SNA together or will try to invade directly if things don’t play as they want remains still to be seen.

On the other side, the ongoing talks to integrate SDF in that same new Syrian Army are an uncomfortable but necessary step, in order to build relations with the transitional government and avoid being outmaneuvered by Turkey. For now, they seem similar of nature to the negotiations with the Assad regime that were held in the past. SDF never reached any agreement with the regime that wouldn’t compromise their integrity and values, and the same is true for the new negotiations with HTS. Negotiations of this kind are diplomatic games, a projection of power of the different actors. If the balance of power changes, negotiations can be pushed in a new direction, with the stronger imposing their will and the other having to accept a compromise. Therefore the most plausible scenario is that those negotiations will get stalled, waiting to solve the differences on the battle field.

Revolutionary greetings!

04/01/25 Negotiations and delegations

The recent handover of strategical border-crossing points in Afrin to HTS is a very relevant development, it shows the will of Turkey to sacrifice SNA militias in exchange for better relations with HTS. Those border crossing points are a big source of tax revenue for the militias that control it, cutting down their access to funds and giving them to HTS will not just improve their economical situation but also reinforce the centralized control that the HTS transitional government is attempting. And of course, Turkey is expecting HTS to not forget that they are helping them with that, gaining a better diplomatic position in future negotiations.

The visit of the French and German foreign ministers to Damascus indicates that Europe is willing to accept the transitional government as legitimate representation of Syria. The video with the awkward moment when Baerbock offers her hand and the reception delegation and they refuse to shake her hand, has been circulating a lot. It is a clear indication of the misogynist approach that this transitional government has. At the same time, they orchestrated a press conference with an unveiled women talking on behalf of the White Helmets, a rescue organization with close ties with HTS and Turkey. This is clearly a move for media spectacle, since any pictures ever seen of women working with White helmets has been always with veil and gloves, and always as having an auxiliary role. This adds to other examples of HTS tokenizing women to appear moderate and aligned with inclusive values, but it is clearly nothing else than a facade.

Revolutionary greetings!

06/01/25 Slowing down the roller coaster

The extreme instability of the last month seems to be slowing down. This is a dangerous time, where the international media attention starts to withdraw, forgetting once again what is happening in Syria. The heavy clashes of Manbij countryside are the new normality, as well as the intensified artillery attacks of Turkish army, as well as the constant drone strikes all over north east Syria. In the big cities of Western Syria the transitional government is tightening their control, with security operations targeting mainly old regime loyalists for now.

The unstable situation of the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheik Mekhsud and Ashrafia in Aleppo is slowly (but silently) escalating tensions. SNA fighters dropped some explosive devices days ago before being shot by local defense forces. Today, a crowd chanting slogans aligned with the transitional government marched towards the Kurdish neighborhoods. YPG forces fired warning shots in the sky to disperse the march, and for now it stopped there.

The local militias from Suwayda “Men of dignity” and “Mountain brigade” made statements rejecting sectarian factional armies and condemning the deadly clashes that took place recently in the south of Syria. It is not clear to us if the clashes where with HTS supporters (as we reported recently) or with old regime loyalist groups. Or maybe with both, reports seem confusing and our lack of trusted sources from southern Syria makes it difficult to get a good grasp of the situation.

The fatigue and exhaustion after more than a month of frantic activity are also weighing on everyone. In these times we can see the dynamics of war switching from sprint to marathon, where endurance and resilience become critical. Those who can’t withstand the pressure, those who break, will open small windows of opportunity for their enemies. SDF has repeatedly proven its strength in this long term race, so now is time to wait for enemy mistakes. As Sun Tzu wrote 15 centuries ago: “To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.”

Revolutionary greetings!

08/01/25 Turkey increase efforts

As SNA weakens, the Turkish army is increasing their role in the Tishreen front lines. Drone strikes are targeting not just military positions, but also SDF supply lines and even the civilian convoy that traveled there. More and more armored vehicles are being supplied to the Turkish proxies, combined with increasing air support from drones and war planes. The resistance of the Tishreen dam is at the moment the warmest front line of all Syria, a decisive battle for the resistance of the DAANES is being fought there.

The reiterated threats of Turkey about a total invasion in Northern Syria are now coming with claims to control ISIS prisons. This could be extremely dangerous, considering how many foreign ISIS fighters could reorganize their cells with Turkish help. Many of them were aided by Turkish state to cross the border to Syria to join ISIS 10 years ago, and Turkey could now use them as leverage to create instability and chaos in many countries.

The Israel “Committee for the Evaluation of the Defense Establishment Budget and the Balance of Power”, led by former National Security Council head Yaakov Nagel, is highlighting the tensions between Israel and Turkey. These two states are competing for hegemony in middle east, and their tensions can become more and more central as both states expand their influence in Syria. How the transitional government balances their occupations (Turkey in the north, Israel in the South) will affect also what role the DAANES and the Kurdish liberation movement will play in Syria.

Revolutionary greetings!

10/01/25 Solving contradictions, creating opportunities

The civilian vigil on Tishreen dam is an example of the readiness of the people in north- east Syria to defend their land, using a wide diversity of tactics. For several years, militants of northern Syria have been discussing the importance of a resistance inspired on the ideas of “revolutionary people’s war”. The ongoing protest in Tishreen, together with the other vigils taking place in the Syrian-Turkish border next to the cities of Qamishlo and Kobane, are an example of civil resistance against occupation. Those actions don’t go in contradiction with the military defense of SDF, instead they complement each other, combining diverse forms of resistance towards a common aim.

The International Coalition is also making some interesting steps, with French army starting to deploy alongside US forces in the border with Turkey and other locations. France has been an important partner of the International Coalition since the beginning, and this is probably related to the fears of French State to foreign ISIS fighters, many of them with French nationality. If HTS or Turkey take control of the prisons currently under control of SDF, that hold thousands of ISIS fighters captive, those prisoners could find their way back to France and endanger the security of many European countries. This is also a preventive move of France, taking precautions before Donald Trump, who declared his intentions to withdraw US soldiers from Syria, takes over the white house.

The Turkish appointed governor of Afrin refused the call of HTS to transfer the management over the local council to an HTS delegation. This reflects how, even if Turkey and HTS are cooperating in many areas, they still have conflicts an power struggles. Those kind of contradictions can evolve to more bitter relations if Turkey refuse to give up control of the regions they occupied in Syria. Contradictions in the relations between Iran and Russia are also surfacing, with declarations of an Iranian commander blaming Russia for not really fighting against the rebel offensive that sparked the collapse of the Regime.

All authoritarian powers, all centralized governments, have always one aim: to accumulate more power. This brings them to cooperate with each other when they can benefit from it, but also to constantly compete and clash against each other. Exploiting these contradictions is necessary to undermine their hegemony. Pushing them to clash on each other can create opportunities for revolutionary forces, but only when those forces are well organized in strong revolutionary movements can really seize those opportunities and develop alternative models against capitalism modernity.

Revolutionary greetings!

13/01/25 Dialog and reconciliations

The preparation for a “national conference” for Syria had been ongoing for some time, but now the announcements are getting more concrete. It is still not clear how this conference will be organized and who will be allowed to take part in it. As details are being clarified, it will become more clear if it is an inclusive and democratic process to engage in a national transition, or if it will be a performative process to legitimize power grab of HTS after the collapse of the Regime.

SDF meetings with HTS continue, and some agreements are being reached as the recently announced joint administrative committees indicate. The diplomatic relations with KRG also continue, suggesting agreements towards Kurdish unity for the future. These diplomatic negotiations are very difficult and fragile, and nothing is concluded yet. Talks about peace and dialog may not sound very radical, but defending the revolutionary achievements of NES is clearly a priority in those talks. Let’s hope for the best, but also let’s get ready for the worst.

Revolutionary greetings!

15/01/25 Moving forward

Now it’s one month and a half since we started to elaborate these reports of curated news, summarizing the ongoing situation in Syria. It has been a very intense and we are very grateful for all support and interest from comrades following this updates. We put a lot of efforts to make sure comrades have access to reliable information about what is happening. As the situation slows down, we also need to catch up with other works we put on hold due to the situation of emergency.

The war stills roaring in Tishreen, and Turkish planes and drones continue their brutal attacks against the people of NES. The bombings on civilian convoys are an extreme example of how far they are willing to go to achieve their aims. The diplomatic talks and other forms of soft power is now the main element, we know the politics are just a continuation of war without blood spilling (as war is a continuation of politics with blood spilling).

For us, this is also a time of action. Not only in the front lines but also on the streets, with popular resistance and grassroots organizing. We want to call you once again to organize commemorations for the Syrian anarchist Omar Aziz, who died in the prison of the al- Assad regime. Wherever you are, you can organize events in solidarity and support the revolution. We hope this can become a ground to build networks of comradeship and mutual aid among anarchist comrades, to support the revolutionary movements in Syria and to question the authoritarian forces that try to impose themselves as new centralized government. Power to the people! power to the local councils and peoples federations! Remember Omar Aziz and all revolutionaries who gave their life for this revolution!

https://rememberomaraziz.net/

Revolutionary greetings!

17/01/25 Dialog and reconciliations II

The meeting between Mazlum Abdi and Masoud Barzani has been celebrated by kurds in cities like Qamishlo. Others look at it with mistrust. Some hope it is the beginning of negotiations towards a process for Kurdish national unity. Together with the meetings of KNK (Kurdish National Council) that recently took place in Qamishlo, we see big efforts from Kurdish political bodies to build national unity and cooperation with the new Damascus administration. This can also bee seen in relation to the recent delegation that visited Abdullah Ocalan in Imrali, that shared a message of dialogue towards peace and stability.

It is the first time that PDK, the ruling party of KRG (Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq), hosts an official delegation from SDF. Besides a brief cooperation in 2012–2013, the relations with PDK and PYD, the main Kurdish political party of north East Syria, had been difficult. PDKs cooperation with Turkey has been a deep contradiction that made any agreements impossible. PDK expanded their activities and influence in some areas of Afrin, under occupation of Turkish proxies. After serious disagreements, the self administration forbid ENKS, a party affiliated with PDK, to continue working in northern Syria. This blockade was lifted some months ago, but the relations still difficult. There are also decades of conflict, even war, between PDK and PKK that will make those negotiations very difficult.

National unity is an important element for any process of national liberation. The promises of a free Kurdistan had been the engine of many Kurdish political parties for several generations, but how this free Kurdistan looks like (and who is ruling it) has been always a point of conflict. The occupation of other nation states of Kurdish land made the creation of a Kurdish state impossible. The proposal of Democratic confederalism moved away from attempts to build a Kurdish state, and instead developed the proposal of democratic nation to build a stateless society. How much this is compatible with current negotiations is something that only time will tell.

Revolutionary greetings!

26/01/25 10 years of the liberation of Kobane and Shibani in Davos

As HTS government consolidates it’s position, asserting their diplomatic influence and expanding their military presence over Syria, their position on the autonomous self- administration starts to be more aggressive. Recent military deployments on the gas and oil fields south of Raqqa were used by some media to claim military advances over SDF, exploiting also ethnic tensions and resentments that may arab nationalists still hold against Kurds. It is not clear how much it was a mistake or disinformation of some media, or how much it was an intentional move to portray the transitional government as strong and decisive against separatism. Assad al-Shibani, FM of the HTS government who recently got his PhD from an Istanbul private university, is calling to disband SDF in the (in)famous World Economic Forum of Davos, while announcing a full embracement of neoliberal economical agenda for Syria.

Al-Sharaa, ‘de facto’ president of Syria, is also making declarations like “The Kurdish People’s Protection Units alone did not respond to our call to restrict weapons to the authorities”. Those statements dismiss not just the ongoing negotiations with SDF, but also how other armed groups also rejected his calls to reorganize the monopoly of violence under direct control of a centralized state. As SDF makes diplomatic moves to consolidate it’s position and strength in the negotiation table, HTS seems to be more inclined to accelerate tensions towards confrontation, knowing they will have full support of Turkey for any military action against SDF. Turkish state media have a long history of fabricated news, and now already twice they spread false information of alleged car bombs going to Aleppo from SDF areas, indicating their readiness to create excuses to justify attacks on SDF.

Let’s not lie, the situation in NES looks difficult. Still, the resistance in Tishreen is an example of the determination to resist against the invasion, to defend the advances of the revolution. We also remember how 10 years ago, 26^th of January of 2015, YPG and YPJ announced the liberation of Kobane from the attacks of ISIS. We should not forget that, because at that time it looked much darker than today. And here we are, the revolution did not just defeat the caliphate, but have been also a key element to the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. It is also making impossible for Turkey to consolidate it’s imperial aspirations in Syria and in Kurdistan. Revolutions are not the easy way, we know that, but difficulties won’t deter us to pursue our dreams of freedom and liberation.

Revolutionary greetings!

26.01.25–01.02.25 On the New Syrian Government’s “Victory Congress”

The Military Operations Administration in Syria announced some dramatic shifts in the country’s governance as results of the so called ‘Victory Congress’. This congress was organized with a high degree of secrecy and was held among military leaders of different factions, including SNA. SDF or DAANES delegates were no invited. The next day Ahmed al-Sharaa gave a public speech on Syria national tv as new president.

Announcements of the “victory congress”:

Ahmed al-Sharaa is now the official president of Syria’s transitional phase. The 2012 Syrian constitution is abolished.
A temporary legislative council will be established to govern the country until a new constitution is drafted and implemented.
All military and security institutions previously loyal to the old regime are officially disbanded
All armed factions and political-revolutionary bodies will be dissolved and integrated into state institutions
The Ba’ath Party, which had ruled Syria for decades, is officially dissolved

Key priorities for the transitional phase announced in the “president speech”:

Establishing a functioning authority to fill the political vacuum.
Ensuring civil peace and preventing further internal conflicts.
Building state institutions that can serve the Syrian people.
Developing a strong economic foundation to drive recovery.
Restoring Syria’s international and regional standing.

Major challenges for the new administration:

Security threats from remaining militant factions and external actors.
Economic hardship, exacerbated by years of war and sanctions.
Political divisions within Syrian opposition groups and international stakeholders.

Declaration of the DAANES about the “Victory congress”

As the DAANES, we emphasize that these decisions should have been taken at a ‘National Congress’ with the participation of everyone. In particular, we do not accept the presence of some terrorists who have the blood of the Syrian people on their hands. Ehmed Ihsan Fayad al-Hayis, who brutally murdered Hevrin Xelef, Secretary General of the Future Syria Party and Mohammad al-Jasim, the head of the Abu Amsha group, complicit in many crimes committed in Afrin, were present at this meeting. We emphasize once again that this meeting is not legitimate and does not represent the Syrian people. Any decision to be taken in Syria without a National Congress including all political circles will be incomplete. The most appropriate solution to end the instability in Syria is a national congress. The exclusion or suspension of any party in Syria from the congress will be no different from the practices of the former regime. On this basis, we once again call on the government in Damascus to refrain from such mistakes. Everyone must take part in the making of the new constitution in Syria. As the DAANES, we once again call for the unity of Syria as part of our national liberation perspective. We emphasize once again that everyone in Syria must have their say about the future of Syria.”

Fuck Hope – Not Your Mascot

Posted on 15/02/2025 - 15/02/2025 by muntjac

Taken from; fuckhope.noblogs.org follow them on insta @fuckh0pe

There are several other versions of this zine / poster avalible on the website. It deliberatly shakes to force you to download the file rather than reading it online, which is always fun.

Not-Your-Mascot-READ

Not-Your-Mascot-PRINT

NYM-Poster-QR

The zine version is also on our ko-fi

Hope / الأمل (Al Amal) #1, 2025

Posted on 11/02/2025 - 11/02/2025 by muntjac

Originally posted on: https://cnt-ait.info/2025/02/09/hope-al-amal-1-2025/ edited slightly for ease of reading

—

الأمل (Al Amal) / Hope is a bilingual (Arabic / English) bimonthly issued jointly by the Sudan Anarchist Gathering, CNT-AIT France and their friends.

It aims to build bridges between anarchists from different continents, in continuation of the campaign of solidarity with the anarchists of Sudan.

If you want to receive the next issues, please contact us : contact@cnt-ait.info

If you want to support financialy the Sudan Anarchist Gathering, you can use our paypal https://www.paypal.com/paypalme/cntait1

(please validate “Sending ‘money to an individual’ to pay less bank charges)

Send an email to contact@cnt-ait.info to inform us of the donation and also so that we can keep you informed of its use.

—

Download(s)

Espoir-AL-Amal-2025-English / Arabic

Espoir-Al-Amal-2025-Spanish / Arabic

Espoir-AL-Amal-2025-French / Arabic

Hope / الأمل (Al Amal) #1, 2025

Why Would You Become an Anarchist in Sudan?

Original in arabic : لماذا تصبح أناركيًا في السودان؟

This question has always haunted me at many moments in a country of ideological, cultural, ethnic, tribal, and political diversity—where countless choices exist, yet none can be freely made. The moment you are born, your identity in Sudan is determined by religion, while your tribe plays a crucial role in shaping your culture and even your fate.

To become an anarchist in Sudan, you must have already escaped all these imposed identities and the suffocating constraints that push us into the furnace of the state.

Sudan is a country where war, crises, and disease have never ceased. Its people, saturated with military, religious, and tribal ideologies, serve as perfect fuel to ignite conflicts.

In such a country, I have always looked at my life with amazement. Our struggles often resemble action films—perhaps bizarre or unbelievable to outsiders—where survival means constantly fleeing from warring factions, dodging a hail of bullets fired directly at you. Bullets of the state, religion, tribe, sect, and armed factions.

Choosing to be an anarchist is an expression of true awareness of the failures of these systems. It is a consciousness that pushes you to the limits of both practical struggle and the deeply complex human experience. And this path leads to only two possible outcomes: you either survive as a true revolutionary resister, or you are consumed by the spiral of power.

Just as authority in Sudan takes many forms, so does opposition. There are political resistance movements, parties, mercenary armed groups, so-called revolutionary and liberal militias built on tribal structures, and cultural factions engaged in deep propaganda-driven authoritarianism.

These intertwined hierarchies form the crises of Sudanese peoples. Sudan is, in reality, a collection of small peoples trapped within a state that wields brutal power, recognizing no human rights beyond its own interests.

Furthermore, the ideology of extremist Islamists has been another tool for deepening ignorance and backwardness in Sudan.

Striving to confront all of this as a lone anarchist is like fighting as a wolf among packs of hyenas. If they find a single weakness in you, it will mean your inevitable destruction.

The path forward begins with seeking out those who share your ideas, developing them, and offering them knowledge and education. As an anarchist, you carry the feeling that wherever you are, and whatever your capacity, your mission is to spread freedom. The price of that freedom may be high—it may even cost you your life. Yet, all of this is just a small contribution to the scale of liberation that people need to live a dignified human life.

Freedom is the highest state of being, and anarchism shows us how to achieve and practice it.

Freedom is not just a poetic word to express aspirations—it is an effort, a commitment to being free with yourself and others, and a struggle to make freedom a reality. To be an anarchist is a blessing that cannot be monopolized or hidden. To be free is to be an anarchist, and to be an anarchist is to be free.

— Fawaz Murtada

Sudan: they are not satisfied with this blood !

After nearly two years of war, the truths and objectives of this war are becoming increasingly clear: the aim is simply to crush the revolution. Bashir’s recent speech, in which he referred to the revolutionaries as « scoundrels, » reflects the typical rhetoric of Islamists when describing young revolutionaries. He further accused them of wanting to return with violence and bloodshed, referring to the beginning of retaliatory operations—something the cadres of the Islamist terrorist movement have threatened since the war began.

They do not see the Janjaweed as their enemy; in fact, they have convinced themselves that this war has already been decided in their favor. But how can they claim victory when the Sudanese people are dead, wounded, displaced, or missing? I wonder how such individuals can even be human like us. These are the same people who killed the people from the start, divided them, sold off the nation’s resources, and then murdered them in cold blood.

I do not know the extent of the destruction they wish to achieve, but I now realize that if new campaigns of oppression emerge, we must rise up, renew our commitment to our martyrs, and resist them until our very last breath.

#TheRevolutionLivesOn, you scoundrels.

— Fawaz Murtada

Standing against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) does not imply siding with the state

Standing against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) does not imply siding with the state, especially for forces that foresaw the trajectory of this war from the outset. However, today, propaganda directed against revolutionary forces seeks to distort and dilute their longstanding opposition to the existence of this mafia since its inception. The divisive policies for Sudan, which the RSF has been accelerating more aggressively than the state itself, reveal the true intentions this institution has tried to impose through force and coups.

I want to highlight the nature of the discourse by leaders of the armed forces, such as the rhetoric we’ve witnessed regarding the newly formed militias under the pretext of fighting the RSF. These narratives have paved the way for the establishment of a peculiar belief in the military weakness of the state’s armed forces. This, in turn, opens the door wide for the emergence of more armies and armed groups. This is the policy of the state’s mafia, characterized by revoltingly sentimental speeches that in no way reflect the sacrifices of the Sudanese people.

Reconciliation with, and the honoring of, those who have killed the people—effectively giving them a platform—does not fall short of the crimes they committed. Instead, it reinforces these crimes and motivates further genocides. The popular forces must begin to build a counterforce to combat the propaganda of both the RSF mafia and the Islamist mafia, through direct confrontation of the lies that accumulate and exacerbate crises, the consequences of which fall solely on the people.

The struggle in Sudan transcends the conventional historical forms of resistance, such as armed struggle in military policies or civil activism through union-building, protests, and political advocacy.

Sudan’s unique context has given rise to diverse forms of struggle, shaped by the multifaceted nature of oppression. This diversity reflects the country’s complexity, even in its injustices. However, anarchists stand out in their deep examination of a critical issue rooted in the fabric of Sudanese society: tribalism—a force more regressive and extreme than nationalism itself.

For decades, Sudanese anarchists have critically analyzed the role of tribalism and its dominance, tracing its impact from the early days of small warring tribal states, through the colonial era’s reliance on tribal alliances, to its current status as a driving force behind Sudan’s persistent conflicts.

While tribalism remains central to the ongoing war and its continuation, Sudanese political forces often address this issue with hesitance, constrained by either political ties to tribes or fear of confronting tribal authority.

To shed light on this neglected issue, comrade Fawaz Murtada will explore the anarchist perspective on the history and impact of tribalism in Sudan through a series of articles.

The Tribe and the State : An Attempt to Analyze Authoritarian Conflict in Sudan from an Anarchist Perspective

This is an attempt from my humble self to explain the authoritarian conflict in Sudan from my point of view as an anarchist born in Sudan, drawing from my knowledge of its conflicts.

Before British colonialism, Sudan did not know a unified state but rather consisted of small states and kingdoms governed by tribal, ethnic, or clan systems, such as the Kingdom of Wadai, the Nubians, the Nuba Mountains’ kingdoms, and many others.

Sudan itself is divided into regions that bear significant cultural and social differences, making it difficult to compare with any other state.

The north of Sudan, for example, is inhabited by the remnants of Nubian kingdoms whose people share cultural ties across the border with Egypt, extending to Aswan.

In eastern Sudan, you will find the Beja tribes, Beni Amer, and Hadendowa, who have deep connections with Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Darfur, too, is divided into north and south regions, with significant cultural and ethnic differences. These areas also have connections with Chad and the Central African Republic.

The large kingdoms that the colonial powers tried to unite in pursuit of wealth, given Sudan’s riches in gold and fertile lands suitable for cotton cultivation at the time, remain at the heart of international disputes over Sudanese resources today. Colonial powers were unable to assimilate these communities into a single entity; instead, they applied policies that resulted in the separation of the north and south, as is still evident today.

All of this shows that, despite the revolutions that sought to expel the colonizers and unify the Sudanese kingdoms and communities, the tribal control system has remained dominant and in control to this day. This is one of the anarchist perspectives we will try to apply to our reality, aiming to deconstruct it through this lens.

Tribe and State

The tribe is a miniature form of social authority that possesses its own authoritarian culture and is governed by the authority of a tribal leader or chief, characterized by a hereditary transfer of leadership in most cases. It has been and continues to be the main obstacle in transforming the Sudanese people from a center of tribal conflict, violence, and immersion in ignorance and backwardness to a better stage.

Colonialism contributed to shaping hostilities between tribes by distinguishing some from others and arming them, granting them state authority, which formed complex coalitions of diverse human groups in even the simplest communal matters.

The transition from tribe to nationhood has not occurred in Sudan, leaving us at a late stage of self-organizational advancement. Even in the form of the modern state post-independence in Sudan, tribal systems and local administrations still control the state in one way or another, paving the way for the spread of racism, tribal conflicts, and civil wars.

The contemporary problem of Sudan, which is exploited by imperialist forces to control its strategic location and vast resources, is the formation of armed movements and militias based on ethnic and racial grounds in an attempt to divide and fragment the country for easier control.

Today, we find that Sudan has seven armed armies that have started fighting among themselves, and it is only a matter of time before chaos engulfs the entire country or it disintegrates. It is essential to combat the tribal mindset within the people, just as it is important to fight against nationalist ideas that lead to ongoing civil wars.

To be continued …

An anarchist from Sudan

A Poem By Kuwasi Balagoon

Posted on 01/02/2025 by muntjac

A poem by Kuwasi Balagoon 

The Leaves Are Changing
To Shades Of Fire 
Rust N Indigo 
In Waves 
And All At Once 
And One By One 
Different In Their Deaths
Like All Times
An Love Ones
An Memories Of Places 
Faded From Lack Of Presence
And Fallen From The Attention Of Today 
To Lie Like A Quilt On The Earth 
And Winter
And Change To The Rich Pungent Ground
That Feeds Realities To Come
With No Questions 

--Kuwasi Balagoon